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Porphyry's rhetoric: texts and translation

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ABSTRACT: This paper provides a working text and translation of the testimonia and fragments relevant to Porphyry's contributions to rhetorical theory.

This paper collects, in Greek and in English translation, the testimonia and fragments relevant to Porphyry's contributions to rhetorical theory. It may be viewed as a supplement to Smith's edition of the fragments (1993), which is very selective in its coverage of the rhetorical fragments. It is also intended to complement the study of Porphyry's rhetoric in Heath (2003a),¹ which provides an introduction to and detailed commentary on the material assembled here, but which (for reasons of space) could not include a text or translation.

The testimonia and fragments vary considerably in the directness of the evidence they provide for Porphyry's work. In one case we have an extensive extract from Porphyry's own theoretical writings (F7); in most others we have brief reports of or allusions to his theories in the words of others. In some cases there is doubt about the full extent of Porphyry's contribution. It is impossible to determine how much of Porphyry there is in the multiply sourced F15, and the suspicion that he has contributed more to F9 than the author's fleeting acknowledgement suggests cannot be proven. On the other hand, Porphyry is identified as a source of F2, which does not name him, by a convincing inference.

This paper offers a working, rather than a properly critical, text. I have not undertaken any new work on the manuscripts; nor do I reproduce the information given in the apparatus to standard editions. In the case of extracts from volume 4 of Walz's *Rhetores Graeci* I have selectively reported the collations of Py published by Kowalski (1940-6, 1947). Suggested improvements to the text in extracts from this and other volumes of Walz not otherwise attributed are (to the best of my knowledge) my own; but for reasons that will be obvious to anyone who has used them, I have not thought it feasible to try to cure all the problems posed by these badly transmitted and badly edited texts. Walz's erratic punctuation has been subjected to extensive tacit revision. In F15 I have placed parallel passages from other sources in a separate column to the right of the Greek text, to facilitate close comparison; in each case the source (usually the Anonymus Seguerianus) is identified at the end of the relevant extract.

The notes to the translation provide a very limited amount of explanatory comment on the content of the fragments. Readers should consult the article cited above for more detailed discussion of the rhetorical theory which they embody, and their place in Porphyry's writings on rhetoric.

¹ Some addenda and corrigenda are given in the Additional Note at the end of the present paper. The research for this paper was completed with the support of a British Academy Research Readership.

1. Texts

Biographical and bibliographical evidence

B1 Eunapius *Lives of the Sophists*

(a) 4.1.1f. (6.11-13 Giangrande): τυχών δὲ τῆς προσηκούσης παιδείας, ἀνά τε ἔδραμε τοσοῦτον καὶ ἐπέδωκεν, ὥς Λογγίνου μὲν ἦν ἀκροατῆς καὶ ἐκόσμει τὸν διδάσκαλον ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου ...

(b) 4.1.1.4 (6.21-24): παρ' ἐκείνῳ δὴ τὴν ἄκραν ἐπαιδεύετο παιδείαν, γραμματικῆς τε εἰς ἄκρον ἀπάσης, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος, ἀφικόμενος καὶ ῥητορικῆς· πλὴν ὅσον οὐκ ἐπ' ἐκείνην ἔνευσε, φιλοσοφίας γε πᾶν εἶδος ἐκματτόμενος ...

(c) 4.2.2-3 (9.11-19): ... οὐδὲν δὲ παιδείας εἶδος παραλελοιπώς. ἔστι γοῦν ἀπορήσαι καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ θαυμάσαι, τί πλεῖον ἔστι τῶν ἐσπουδασμένων, πότερον τὰ εἰς ὕλην ῥητορικὴν τείνοντα, ἢ τὰ εἰς γραμματικὴν ἀκρίβειαν φέροντα, ἢ ὅσα τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡρτῆται, ἢ ὅσα νεύει πρὸς γεωμετρίαν, ἢ ὅσα πρὸς μουσικὴν ῥέπει. τὰ δὲ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ λόγους καταληπτόν, οὔτε τὸ ἠθικὸν ἐφικτὸν λόγῳ· τὸ δὲ φυσικὸν καὶ θεουργὸν τελεταῖς ἀφείσθω καὶ μυστηρίοις· οὕτω παντομιγές τι πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀρετὴν ὁ ἀνὴρ αὐτὸς χρῆμά τι γέγονεν.

(d) 4.3 (10.11-13): κατὰ τούτους ἦσαν τοὺς χρόνους καὶ τῶν ῥητορικῶν οἱ ἐπ' Ἀθήνησι προεστῶτες Παῦλλός τε καὶ Ἀνδρόμαχος ἐκ Συρίας.

B2 Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* 10.3 (Porphyry 408F Smith)

Πορφυρίου περὶ τοῦ κλέπτας εἶναι τοὺς Ἑλληνας, ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου τῆς Φιλολόγου Ἀκροάσεως· τὰ Πλατώνεια ἔστιν ἡμᾶς Λογγίνος Ἀθήνησι κέκληκεν ἄλλους τε πολλοὺς καὶ Νικαγόραν τὸν σοφιστὴν καὶ Μαῖορα, Ἀπολλωνίων τε τὸν γραμματικὸν καὶ Δημήτριον τὸν γεωμέτρην Προσήνην τε τὸν Περιπατητικὸν καὶ τὸν Στωϊκὸν Καλλιέτην. μεθ' ὧν ἑβδομος αὐτὸς κατακλινείς, τοῦ δείπνου προκόπτοντος καὶ τινος ζητήσεως περὶ Ἐφόρου ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις γενομένης ...

B3 *Suda* Π2098

Πορφύριος, ὁ κατὰ Χριστιανῶν γράψας, ὃς κυρίως ἐκαλεῖτο Βασιλεύς· Τύριος, φιλόσοφος, μαθητὴς Ἀμελίου τοῦ Πλωτίνου μαθητοῦ, διδάσκαλος δὲ Ἰαμβλίου, γεγονώς ἐπὶ τῶν χρόνων Αὐρηλιανοῦ καὶ παρατείνας ἕως Διοκλητιανοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως. ἔγραψε βιβλία πάμπλειστα, φιλοσοφὰ τε καὶ ῥητορικὰ καὶ γραμματικά. ἦν δὲ καὶ Λογγίνου τοῦ κριτικοῦ ἀκροασάμενος. Περὶ θείων ὀνομάτων α', Περὶ ἀρχῶν β', Περὶ ὕλης γ', Περὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς Βόηθον ε', Περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων δ', Περὶ τοῦ Γνώθι σαυτὸν δ', Περὶ ἀσωμάτων, Περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι τὴν Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους αἴρεσιν ζ', Εἰς τὴν Ἰουλιανοῦ τοῦ Χαλδαίου φιλοσόφου ἱστορίαν ἐν βιβλίοις δ', Κατὰ Χριστιανῶν λόγους ιε', Περὶ τῆς Ὁμήρου φιλοσοφίας, Πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην <περὶ> τοῦ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν, Φιλολόγου ἱστορίας

βιβλία ε', Περὶ γένους καὶ εἶδους καὶ διαφορᾶς καὶ ἰδίου καὶ συμβεβηκότος, Περὶ τῶν κατὰ Πίνδαρον τοῦ Νείλου πηγῶν, Περὶ τῆς ἐξ Ὁμήρου ὠφελείας τῶν βασιλέων βιβλία ι', Συμμίκτων ζητημάτων ζ', Εἰς τὸ Θουκυδίδου προοίμιον, Πρὸς Ἀριστείδην ζ', Εἰς τὴν Μινουκιανοῦ τέχνην, καὶ ἄλλα πλεῖστα, καὶ μάλιστα ἀστρονομούμενα, ἐν οἷς καὶ Εἰσαγωγὴν ἀστρονομουμένων ἐν βιβλίοις τρισί, καὶ Γραμματικὰς ἀπορίας. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Πορφύριος ὁ τὴν κατὰ Χριστιανῶν ἐφύβριστον γλῶσσαν κινήσας.

Testimonia and fragments

F1a Sopater *RG* 5.9.14-22 (Porphyry 415F Smith)

ὁ δὲ Πορφύριος ἀπολογούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ Μινουκιανοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔγκλημα ἐγκαλουμένου (καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος εἰπὼν ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐρεῖ πᾶν ζήτημα πολιτικόν, οὐ προσεδίδαξεν οὔτε τίς ὁ ῥήτωρ οὔτε τίς ἡ ῥητορική) ταύτην τὴν ἀπολογία ἀποτείνεται, ἥτις καὶ ὑπὲρ Ἑρμογένους ἀρμόσει λέγεσθαι. φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι οὐ περὶ πάσης² τῆς ῥητορικῆς διελάμβανεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ μόνου τοῦ δικανικοῦ καὶ συμβουλευτικοῦ. περιττὸν οὖν μέρους ἐξέτασιν ποιοῦμενον περὶ πάσης λέγειν τῆς τέχνης.³

F1b ?Marcellinus *PS* 293.14-26 (Porphyry 415bF Smith)

ἐμέμψαντο δὲ τινες τὸν Ἑρμογένην, διὰ τί τέχνην ῥητορικὴν μέλλων συγγράφειν τὸν ὅρον αὐτῆς πρό γε πάντων οὐκ ἀποδέδωκεν. καὶ φησι Πορφύριος ὅτι τριῶν ὄντων τῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰδῶν, συμβουλευτικοῦ καὶ δικανικοῦ καὶ πανηγυρικοῦ, τὸ πανηγυρικὸν οὐχ ὑποπίπτει τῷ περὶ τῶν στάσεων λόγῳ, ἐπειδὴ αἱ μὲν στάσεις ἀμφιβολίαν ἔχουσιν ἀμφισβητουμένων πραγμάτων, τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια ὁμολογουμένων αὐξήσιν ἀγαθῶν. τοῦ τοίνυν πανηγυρικοῦ ὑπεξαίρουμένου εἶδους ἀτελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· οἱ δὲ ὅροι οὐ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν τελείων εἰσὶ πραγμάτων. διὰ τοῦτο, φησί, ῥητορικῆς οὐκ ἀποδέδωκεν ὅρον ὥς οὐ περὶ πάσης διαλαμβάνων ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πραγματείᾳ.

F1c Athanasius *PS* 181.13-15 (Porphyry 415aF Smith)

οὐ γὰρ παραδεκτέον τὴν Πορφυρίου ἀπολογία ὑπὲρ Μινουκιανοῦ καὶ περὶ Ἑρμογένους.

F2a Sopater *RG* 5.5.28-8.30

[5.28] διαλαβόντας οὖν ἡμᾶς περὶ τοῦ ὁποία τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ὁπόθεν ἤρξατο καὶ ἦκεν διαλαβεῖν. ἦν μὲν ἄνωθεν παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς. τοῦτο φασιν Ὁμηρον ἐνδείκνυσθαι λέγοντα, 'οἱ δὲ θεοὶ παρ' Ζηνὶ καθήμενοι ἡγορόωντο' [*Iliad* 4.1]. ἤκμασε δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἥρωσι. καὶ ὁ μὲν Πλάτων καὶ τοῦνομα αὐτῆς⁴ ἐκ τούτου δίδωσι, παρὰ τὸ εἶρειν καὶ λέγειν· τοὺς γὰρ

² ταύτης Walz. For the correction cf. 26f. (ὅτι περὶ πάσης τέχνης διαλαμβάνεται), *PS* 293.25 (F1b).

³ In the discussion that follows (9.22-14.17) there are references to ὁ Πορφύριος λόγος at 5.9.27, 11.29, 14.17f.

⁴ αὐτῶν?

ἥρωας διαλεκτικούς οἶδε καὶ ῥητορικούς [Cratylus 398de]. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς παντοῖα εἰδὼς ῥητορικῆς παραδείγματα. τὸν μὲν γὰρ ταχὺν καὶ σύντομον καὶ ἀποδεικτικὸν ῥήτορά φησι λέγειν 'νιφάδεσσιν ὅμοια' [Iliad 3.222], καὶ τὸν πυκνὸν καὶ σύντομον, οὐδὲν δὲ ἥττον ἀποδεικτικόν, 'παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως' [Iliad 3.214]. οἶδεν δὲ τὴν ἀταξίαν τῆς δημαγωγίας καὶ τοὺς ἀδιακρίτως καὶ ἀτέχνως λέγοντας, ὅποιοί ποτέ εἰσιν, ὥσπερ τὸν Θερσίτην, 'ὅς ῥ' ἔπεα φρεσὶν ἦσιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλὰ τε ἤδη' [Iliad 2.213].

[6.12] καὶ πρῶτόν γε ἀπάντων γενέσθαι φασὶ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις λόγον εἰπεῖν κατηγορικόν, κατηγοροῦντα Θησέα ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ Ἱππολύτου, μεταξὺ δὲ σβεσθῆναι. τῶν γὰρ τυραννίδων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γενομένων ἀναγκαίως ἡ ῥητορικὴ πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν σπουδάζουσα καὶ ἐναντία οὖσα ταῖς τυραννίσιν ἔγκλημά τε ἦν καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον γίνεσθαι. ἐν δὲ Σικελίᾳ λέγεται Φάλαριν δημαγωγικὸν λόγον εἰπεῖν καὶ ὑπαγαγέσθαι τὸ πλῆθος πιθανότητι, ὥστε καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα ἐλθεῖν.

[6.20] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Κόραξ πρῶτον ἀπάντων συνεστήσατο διδασκαλίαν περὶ ῥητορικῆς· οἱ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύοντες τὴν τέχνην ὡς ἐμπειρία τινὶ καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ χρώμενοι ἐπετήδευον, καὶ οὕτως⁵ μὲν οὐ μετὰ λόγου καὶ αἰτίας, οὐδὲ τέχνης τινός. τούτου δὲ τοῦ Κόρακος Τισίας γέγονε μαθητὴς, περὶ οὗ λέγεται τοιοῦτόν τι· Τισίαν συνθέσθαι τῷ Κόρακι χιλίας δραχμὰς ἡνίκα ἂν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἀγωνιζόμενος τὴν πρώτην νίκην νικήσειεν· ὄντος δὲ πρεσβυτέρου τοῦ Κόρακος οὐ προΐει ἐν δικαστηρίῳ, ἐπὶ τῷ τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ Κόρακος κερδᾶναι τὰς ἐπαγγελίας. ἐγράψατο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κόραξ χρέος, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον εἶπε τοῖς δικαστοῖς, ὅτι 'ἐὰν ἡττηθῇ μοι Τισίας τὴν τοῦ χρέους γραφὴν ὀφείλει μοι δοῦναι τὰς χιλίας· τὴν γὰρ πρώτην δίκην νενίκηκε κατὰ τὴν συνθήκην.' ὁ δὲ Τισίας τὸ ἐναντίον ἀπεκρίνατο λέγων, ὅτι 'εἰ μὲν ἡττήθην τὴν τοῦ χρέους γραφὴν, οὐκ ὀφείλω δοῦναι, νενίκηκα γὰρ τὴν τοῦ χρέους γραφὴν.'⁶ τοιούτων γὰρ ἀποκρίσεων ῥηθειςὼν εἰς ἀπορίαν μὲν ἦλθον οἱ δικασταί, ἐβόησαν δὲ 'κακοῦ Κόρακος κακὸν ὦν.'

[7.9] ζῆλος οὖν εἰς τούτους πολλὸς τῆς τέχνης γέγονε, καὶ Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐλθὼν Ἀθήνησι τὴν τέχνην τὴν συγγραφεῖσαν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκόμισεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἑτέραν προσέθηκε· καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Ῥαμνοῦσιος, ὁ Θουκυδίδου διδασκαλος λέγεται τέχνην γράψαι, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ Ἰσοκράτης ὁ ῥήτωρ. καὶ πᾶσαι μὲν αὗται δημαγωγικαὶ τέχναι εἰσὶν, οὐδὲν περὶ στάσεων ἔχουσαι κεφάλαιον ἢ τούτων τῶν νῦν ἐπιτηδευομένων, πιθανότητος δὲ τινος, πῶς δεῖ δῆμον ὑπαγαγέσθαι. καὶ ὅτι μὲν χρῶνται λέγοντες οἱ παλαιοὶ τέχνῃ, ὠμολόγηται· φαίνονται γὰρ τὰς αὐτὰς ὑποθέσεις ἐν διαφόροις λόγοις καὶ διαφόροις ῥητοῖς ῥήτορες ἀεὶ ὁμοίως μελετῶντες, καὶ τὴν στοχαστικὴν ἀεὶ στοχαστικῶς καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς κεφαλαίοις, καὶ τὴν πραγματικὴν τοῖς τῆς πραγματικῆς· δῆλον οὖν ὡς παραδόσει τινὶ ταῦτα ἐγίνωσκον. αἱ μὲν οὖν γραφεῖσαι περὶ τούτων οὐ διελάμβανον. ὅτι δὲ καὶ δικανικαὶ τέχναι ἦσαν γεγραμμέναι παρ' αὐτῶν

⁵ οὔτος Walz: corr. Radermacher (1951) 16. οὔτοι Gercke (1897) 345.

⁶ For the problem in this passage see n.48 below.

δηλοῖ Ἰσοκράτης λέγων· ἄλλοι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν γεγονότες καὶ τὴν καλουμένην τέχνην συγγράψαι τολμήσαντες, οὓς οὐκ ἀφετέον ἀνεπιτιμήτους, οἳ τινες οὔτε ἔσχον τὸ⁷ δικάζεσθαι διδάσκειν, ἐκλεξάμενοι τὸ δυσχερέστερον τῶν νοημάτων· [13.19]. αὐταὶ μέντοι αἱ δικανικαὶ τέχναι οὐδαμοῦ σώζονται. εἴτε οὖν ἐν αὐταῖς τὰ κεφάλαια ταῦτα καὶ αἱ στάσεις ἐπενοήθησαν, εἴτε καὶ ἄλλως ἐκ διδασκαλίας αὐτὰ παρέλαβον, δηλὸν ὅτι αὐτοὶ τέχνη μετήεσαν, καὶ δηλὸν ἐστὶν ἅψ' ὧν τὰς ὑποθέσεις πάντες ὁμοίως μελετήσαντες φαίνονται.

[8.5] ἤκμασε δὲ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τῇ δημαγωγίᾳ κατὰ τὸν Δημοσθένους καιρὸν ἡ ῥητορικὴ. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀντιπάτρου βασιλείας, ἡνίκα Ὑπερίδης μὲν ἐγλωσσοτομήθη, Δημοσθένης δὲ ἀπέθανεν, ἐνενήκοντα δὲ καὶ ὀκτὼ λέγονται ἐκδοθῆναι ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν ῥήτορες, ἀάμπολλοι δὲ ἀπὸ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος, φοβερόν [δὲ] τὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς γέγονεν, καὶ ἡμάρτηται τῶν Μακεδονικῶν κακῶν κατεχόντων τὴν Ἑλλάδα. ἡνίκα δὲ ἡ Ῥωμαίων ἤκμασεν ἀρχὴ καὶ πολιτεία σῶφρων κατέσχε τὰς πόλεις μάλιστα ἐπὶ Ἀδριανοῦ καὶ Ἀντωνίνου, ῥητορικῶν καὶ φιλολόγων βασιλέων, αὐθις αἱ τέχναι συνετάθησαν. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ Κικέρων καὶ ἔτι τούτων πρεσβύτερος ὢν ταύτην τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἐπιστάμενος, ἐξ ὧν δηλὸν ὅτι ἐσώζετο.

[8.18] τῶν δὲ νῦν φερομένων τεχνικῶς πρῶτος Λολλιανὸς φαίνεται ἐπὶ μόνας στάσεις εἰπών, καὶ Ἑρμαγόρας μετ' αὐτὸν πέντε,⁸ μετὰ τούτους ὁ Μινουκιανός. λέγεται δὲ πρῶτος ὁ Μινουκιανός εἰς τὰς δεκατρεῖς στάσεις διελεῖν, καὶ ὀνόματα ἀπὸ τοῦ σκοποῦ τῆς ἀπολογίας ποιήσασθαι. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον Ἑρμογένης ἐγένετο, γένει μὲν ἐκ Ταρσοῦ τῆς Κιλικίας, υἱὸς Καλλίππου νεώτερος, σφόδρα ταύτην τὴν τέχνην συνθείς· λέγεται γὰρ ὀκτωκαιδεκαέτης προσελθεῖν Ἀδριανῷ τῷ βασιλεῖ λέγων, ἤκω σοι βασιλεῦ ῥήτωρ παιδωγούμενος, ῥήτωρ ἡλικίας δεόμενος· [Philostratus *Lives of the Sophists* 2.7 (577-8)]. γενόμενος δὲ εἴκοσι πέντε ἐτῶν λέγεται παντελῶς ἐκστῆναι, ὥστε καὶ ἀγνοῆσαι ἃ αὐτὸς συνέθηκεν.

F2b Anon. PS 59.21-60.17

εἰ ἐκ θεοῦ πᾶν ἀγαθόν, ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἀγαθὸν γὰρ οὐσα ἐκ θεοῦ ἐστίν. εἰ ἐν θεοῖς ἡ ῥητορικὴ, φαίνεται Ὅμηρος λέγων, οἳ δὲ θεοὶ παρὰ Ζηνὶ καθήμενοι ἡγορόωντο· [*Iliad* 4.1], ὃ ἐστὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. εἰ ἐν ἥρωσιν, ὡς Ὅμηρος, ἔπεα νιφάδεσιν εὐόκοτα· [*Iliad* 3.222]. ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν ἡρώων <...> ἐν Σικελίᾳ εὐρέθη Φαλάριδος ἐπασκήσαντος τὸ λέγειν. εἴτα Κόραξ καὶ Τισίας, ὁ μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ. εἴτα Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος εἰς Ἀθήνας <ἐλθὼν> καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔγραψαν τέχνας καὶ μεγάλοι ἐγένοντο καὶ ἐπίσημον τὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ὄνομα ἐποίησαν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. ὅτι κατὰ τὰ Μακεδονικὰ ἐσβέσθη τὸ τῶν ῥητόρων ὄνομα καὶ φευκτὸν καὶ βαρὺ καὶ ὀλοκίνδυνον ἐδόκει. Ἀντίπατρος δὲ ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν ῥήτορας ἀπέκτεινε β καὶ ρ <...> ἐκ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος. ἔπειτα ἀκμασάντων τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν πραγμάτων Ἑρμαγόρας

⁷ οὔτε ἔσχον τὸ: Isocrates' text reads ὑπέσχοντο.

⁸ Comparison with RG 5.79.10-15 and PS 60.13-15 (F2b) shows that the two names have been accidentally transposed here. See Gloeckner (1901) 52f.

ἔγραψε πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ Λολλιανός. Ἑρμαγόρας στάσεις οἶδεν ἐπτά, Λολλιανός δὲ πέντε. πρῶτος δὲ Μινουκιανός ἐξέθετο περὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ στάσεων. ἔπειτα γενόμενος ὁ Ἑρμόγενης τούτου πολλῆς ἀσαφείας κατέγνω, αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ ἀκρίβειας ἐξέθετο ὡς τοῦ Μινουκιανοῦ προκρίνεσθαι.

F3 Nicolaus *Progymnasmata* 55.18-20 Felten

διὸ ὑπ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ παρὰ τῷ Κορνούτῳ ὀνομαζόμενα καὶ Πορφυρίῳ ἅπαντα χρὴ πειρᾶσθαι ἀνάγειν τὰ πράγματα.⁹

F4a Syrianus 2.14.9-14 (Porphyry 416F Smith)

διόπερ καλῶς καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν στάσεων τέχνῃ ἐκεῖνό φησιν, ἡλίκον ἢ τῶν νοημάτων εὗρεσις ἐν λόγῳ δύναται μνηύων, τοῦ γὰρ λόγου ψυχὴν δοκοῦντος ἔχειν καὶ σῶμα ἢ μὲν τῶν νοημάτων εὗρεσις δικαίως ἂν ψυχὴ τοῦ λόγου νομίζοιτο, ἢ δὲ ἐρμηνεία σῶμα.⁷

F4b Syrianus 1.93.9-13 (apparatus to Porphyry 416F Smith)

ὅθεν καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος Πορφύριος πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα καλῶς ἀποβλέψας ἔφη λίαν εὖ ἐχόντως, ὅτι δὴ τοῦ λόγου ψυχὴν δοκοῦντος ἔχειν καὶ σῶμα ἢ μὲν τῶν νοημάτων εὗρεσις δικαίως ἂν ψυχὴ τοῦ λόγου νομίζοιτο, ἢ δὲ ἐρμηνεία σῶμα.

F4c Anon. *RG* 7.1086.12-7.1

ὅθεν καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος Πορφύριος πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα καλῶς ἀποβλέψας ἔφη λίαν νουνεχόντως, ὅτι δὴ τοῦ λόγου ψυχὴν δοκοῦντος καὶ σῶμα ἔχειν, ἢ μὲν τῶν νοημάτων εὗρεσις δικαίως ἂν ψυχὴ τοῦ λόγου νομίζοιτο, ἢ δὲ ἐρμηνεία σῶμα. Πορφύριος οὖν φησι ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, καὶ καλῶς ἀποφαίνεται.

F5 Anon., Par. 3032 fol. 137r (Porphyry 417F Smith)¹⁰

ὅτι ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ τῶν ῥητορικῶν ζητημάτων φησὶν, ὅτι τρία εἰσὶν τὰ γενικώτατα ζητήματα· εἰ ἐστίν, τί ἐστίν, ὁποῖόν τι ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ μὲν εἰ ἐστίν <ἐν τῷ στοχασμῷ ζητεῖται, τὸ δὲ τί> ἐστίν ἐν τῷ ὄρω, τὸ δὲ ὁποῖόν τι ἐστίν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις.

F6a Anon. *RG* 7.921.2-4

αὐτίκα γοῦν ὁ φιλόσοφος Πορφύριος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν στάσεων τέχνῃ περιστατικά φησιν ἐπτά· πρόσωπον, πρᾶγμα, χρόνον, τόπον, τρόπον, αἰτίαν, ὕλην.

F6b Maximus Planudes *RG* 5.466.18f.

... τοὺς λέγοντας, ὧν καὶ Πορφύριος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐστίν, ἑβδομον περιστατικὸν τὴν ὕλην.

⁹ Cf. 54.23-5 (πανηγυρικόν ... δικανικὸν καὶ συμβουλευτικόν), 3.20-4.5 etc. See also F1b.

¹⁰ Rabe (1907) 561 n.2. I have added ζητεῖται to Rabe's supplement.

F7 Porphyry *RG* 4.397.8-399.26

[397.8] ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους σημεῖα ποιούμενος ὁ κατήγορος δοκεῖ βιάζεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν καὶ πείθειν ὡς τοῦ ἐγκαλουμένου ἕνεκεν ταῦτα πεποίηκεν ὁ φεύγων, δεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀγωνίζεσθαι τὸν φεύγοντα, καὶ μὴ τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἀδικήματος ἕνεκεν φάσκειν πεποιηκέναι ἢ εἰρηκέναι ἢ τὸ πάθος συμβεβηκέναι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ μετάθεσις τῆς αἰτίας, ὃ χρῶμα προσαγορεύουσιν οἱ Ἑρμαγόρειοι.

[397.15] ὑπάρχει δὲ λύσις τῶν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους, λύσις δὲ μετὰ ἀντιθέσεως· καὶ ἔσται ἢ ἀντιστατική ἢ μεταστατική ἢ ἀντεγκληματική ἢ συγγνωμονική. ἀντιστατική μὲν ἐὰν ὀφελός τι προβαλόμεθα, οἷον 'ἀναλαμβάνω τοὺς ἀποκηρύκτους, ἵνα μὴ ἀποροῦντες ἐπὶ κλοπὴν ἢ ἐπιβουλὴν τράπωνται.' κἀκεῖνα δὲ ὁμοίως ἀντιστατικά, ὅταν ὅπλα ἔχων κρίνηται τυραννίδος ἐπιθέσεως· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ὅτι 'φυλάττω τῇ πόλει εἰς ἀναγκαίαν ἐπίδοσιν.' <μεταστατική δὲ ... ἀντεγκληματική δὲ ... > συγγνωμονικὰ δὲ ὅσα λαμβάνεται ὑπ' ἀγνοίας ἢ μέθης (οἷον πλούσιος νέος ὤμοσεν ἐν συμποσίῳ τυραννήσειν· λέξει γὰρ ὅτι 'ἐν εὐωχίᾳ καὶ μέθῃ οὐδεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν λεγομένων πολυπραγμονεῖ') καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας ('νέων ἐστὶ τὸ καὶ τυραννίδας ἀπειλεῖν καὶ τοιαῦτα ἀλαζονεύεσθαι')· καὶ ἀπὸ ἐλέου ἐστὶ μετάθεσις, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ θάπτοντος τὸ νεοσφαγὲς σῶμα (ὅτι 'ἐλεῶν ἔθαπτον').

[397.30] διττὴ δὲ τῶν χρωμάτων ἡ ἀνωτάτω διαφορὰ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν¹¹ τῇ ὑποθέσει κείμενα εὐρίσκομεν, τὰ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν εὐρίσκομεν καὶ ποριζόμεθα. παρέχει μὲν οὖν αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίᾳ γυναικὶ τάλαντον καταλιπόντος ἐν διαθήκαις καὶ εἰπόντος 'σωφροσύνης ἕνεκα καταλείπω', εἶτα κρινομένης μοιχείας. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ χρῶμα κεῖται ἐν τῷ ζητήματι, ὅτι διὰ σωφροσύνης ἢ χάρις. ἔξωθεν δὲ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ζητοῦντες τὸ χρῶμα ποριζόμεθα, ὡς ὁ ἀφορῶν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν πλούσιος· φήσει γὰρ ἐλεεῖν τοὺς τυραννουμένους.

[398.9] περὶ δὲ ποσότητος τῶν χρωμάτων, πότερον πλείοσι χρηστέον ἢ ἐνὶ καὶ πότερον πεπλανημένοις ἢ συμφωνοῦσιν, εἴρηται.

[398.11] ἐκβάλλει δὲ τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ φεύγοντος ὁ κατήγορος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀκολούθου ἀναιρέσεως ἢ ἀπαιτήσεως. οἷον Περικλῆς παρὰ Μεγαρεῦσι κρίνεται διὰ τὸ ψήφισμα ἐκεῖσε κατενεχθεῖς. λέξει γὰρ 'ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πεποίηκα· μελλόντων γὰρ Ἀθηναίων στρατεύειν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἔστησα τῷ ψηφίσματι τὴν ὀργήν.' ὁ δὲ ἐναντίος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀκολούθου ἀπαιτήσεως ἐκβαλεῖ λέγων ὅτι 'χρὴν σε τοιγαροῦν ὕστερον λῦσαι.' ἡ συναγωγὴ δὲ τούτου ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀκολούθου ἀναιρέσεως· 'οὐ τοίνυν ἐποίησας τοῦτο· οὐκ ἄρα Μεγαρεῦσι χαριζόμενος ἔγραψας.' ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν ἐξ ἀκολουθίας ἀπαιτήσει προτάττεται μὲν τὸ κατὰ θέσιν, ἔπεται δὲ τὸ κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν. †κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν δὲ πάλιν τὸν τρόπον† προτάττοντες διὰ τῆς θέσεως

¹¹ ἐν Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 58); om. Walz (397.31).

κατασκευάζομεν,¹² οἷον· ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἔπραττες· οὐκ ἔδει σε ἐπιμεῖναι τῇ τοῦ πινακίου γραφῇ οὐδὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐνστήναι¹³ ἀξιοῦσι τὸ ψήφισμα ἀνελεῖν. ἐποίησας δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνέστης· οὐκ ἄρα τῇ πρὸς Μεγαρέας εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ἔπραξας· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τρέφοντος τοὺς ἀποκηρύκτους· ἐρεῖ μὲν ὁ τρέφων ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως πεποίηκα, ἵνα μὴ σπάνει τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐπιβουλεύσωσι τῇ πόλει, ὁ δὲ λύσει λέγων ἐν σπάνει τῆς πόλεως οὔσης ἔδει φιλοτιμεῖσθαι σῖτον ἢ δεομένην χρημάτων εἰσφέρειν· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἐχαρίσω, οὐκ ἄρα εὐνοίᾳ πεποίηκας· τοῦτο πάλιν ἐξ ἀκολούθου ἀπαιτήσεως, εἴτα ἀναιρέσεως. ἢ πάλιν ἄλλ' ἐλεῶν ἔτρεφον, ὁ δὲ ἐκβάλλει λέγων ἐχρῆν τοὺς οἰκείους τοὺς γένει προσήκοντας, τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας τῶν πολιτῶν, οὐχὶ τοὺς πονηροτάτους, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀκολούθου ἀπαιτήσεως. καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ παραπρεσβείας λέγοντος Αἰσχίνου περὶ Φωκέων ὅτι ἠπατήθην, ὅρα πῶς ἐκβολὴν ἐποίησατο τοῦ χρώματος· ἔδει τοίνυν μισεῖν τὸν ἀπατήσαντα¹⁴, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ μισεῖς, οὐκ ἄρα ἠπατήθης [cf. 19.102-4]. ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως οὕτως· οὐκ ἐχρῆν τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν, οὐδὲ περὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ὑβριστὴν εἶναι καὶ ἀγνώμονα· καὶ περὶ τοὺς πολίτας δὲ ὑπάρχεις βίαιος καὶ περὶ τοὺς οἰκείους ἀγνώμων· οὐκ ἄρα οὔτε κηδεμονία τῆς πόλεως, οὔτε οἶκτῳ τούτους τρέφεις· καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐξ ἀναιρέσεως· τούτων οὐδένα ἀκούω τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ ὑμεῖς [19.109].

[399.18] δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προοιμίων ἀναιρεῖν τὰ χρώματα, ὃ δὴ καὶ Δημοσθένης εἶωθε ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀντιθέσεων, πολύων πρὸ καιροῦ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις.

[399.20] ἔστιν ἐκβολὴ χρωμάτων καὶ ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν ὑπεξαίρεσις. προαναιροῦμεν γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἵνα εἰς ἓν περικλείσωμεν τὸν ἀντίδικον, οἷον ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς κρινομένης μοιχείας ἐπειδὴ νύκτωρ ἐδάκρυεν· ἐρεῖ ὁ κατήγορος· οὐ πατήρ σοι τέθνηκεν, οὐκ ἀδελφός, οὐ παῖδες· ᾧ καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐχρήσατο λέγων· ἐὰν δείξις ὡς δι' εὐήθειαν ἢ ἄγνοϊαν [19.98].

F8 Sopater *Division of Questions* 35.20-26¹⁵

μετὰ ταῦτα θήσεις παραγραφικόν, ὥς φησι Πορφύριος, ἀπὸ τοῦ τρόπου. φησὶ γὰρ οὐκ εὐλογον εἶναι τὴν τοῦ συνειδότης κατηγορίαν, μὴ ἐν νομίμῳ δικαστηρίῳ κριθέντων ἐκείνων μηδὲ ἀλόντων κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλ' ὑποπεσόντων ἐχθρῶν κακοηθείᾳ. τινὲς μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τούτου τοῦ ζητήματος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων χρῶνται παραγραφικῶ, τινὲς δὲ οὔ.

F9 'Sopater and Marcellinus' *RG* 4.520.20-522.26

[520.20] ἐξ ὧν δὲ τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους αὐξήσομεν, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν πηλικότητα ἐργασόμεθα. καὶ ἔ<σ>τι πρῶτος μὲν τόπος τῶν αὐξητικῶν

¹² The text here (398.23f.) is clearly corrupt. κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν is assimilated to end of previous sentence. Possibly: καὶ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν δὲ πάλιν τὸν <αὐτὸν> τρόπον προτάττοντες διὰ τῆς θέσεως κατασκευάζομεν.

¹³ ἐκστήναι Walz.

¹⁴ ἀπατήσαντα Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 77); ἀπατήσοντα Walz (399.10f.).

¹⁵ Text: Innes and Winterbottom (1988) 39f.

ἐπιχειρημάτων ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς ποσότητος· ἔ<σ>τι δὲ οὗτος τοιοῦτος, ὅτ' ἂν δι' ἑνὸς τοῦ πραχθέντος πολλὰ ἔχωμεν ἢ τὰ κακουργηθέντα ἢ τὰ εὐεργετηθέντα δεικνύναι· δεύτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦ, οἷον τίνι διαφέρει, πότερον τῇ πόλει ἢ τῷ παθόντι, καὶ πότερον δημοσίᾳ τὴν πόλιν ἡδίκησεν ἢ εὐηργέτησεν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ὁ τοῦτο ποιήσας.

[520.28] κατασκευάσομεν δὲ ταῦτα

ἀπὸ τῶν τελικῶν·

- ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνδόξου¹⁶ εἰ τύχοι, ὅτι δόξαν πολλὴν τὸ πραχθὲν προξενεῖ τῇ πόλει ἢ ἀδοξίαν καὶ ὕβριν.

- ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ, ὅτι καλὸν τὸ πεπραγμένον ἢ πάλιν αἰσχρόν.

ἀπὸ τῶν παρακολουθούντων τῇ πράξει· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα, ὡς πολλάκις δεδήλωται, πρόσωπον, τόπος, τρόπος, χρόνος, αἰτία, γνώμη, κατὰ δὲ Πορφύριον καὶ καιρὸς καὶ ὕλη. καὶ

<ἀπὸ τῶν παρακολουθούντων τῷ προσώπῳ>¹⁷ ιδιότης, ἡλικία, ἀξία, ἐπιτήδευσις, τύχη.

<ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰκότος> τὸ εἰκὸς τοῦ καιροῦ, τὸ εἰκὸς τοῦ τρόπου, τὸ εἰκὸς τοῦ τόπου, τὸ εἰκὸς τῆς αἰτίας.

[521.4] <ἀπὸ τῶν παρακολουθούντων τῇ πράξει>

- ἀπὸ προσώπου, οἷον ὑμεῖς γὰρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Λακεδαιμονίων γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἀρχόντων καὶ τὰ κύκλῳ τῆς Ἀττικῆς κατεχόντων ἀρμοσταῖς καὶ φρουραῖς, Τάναγραν, Εὐβοίαν, τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἅπασαν [Dem. 18.96].

- ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου· εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐν παραβύστῳ ἀλλ' ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ γέγονεν ἡ πρᾶξις, μέγα τὸ ἀδίκημα διὰ τὸ ἐπίσημον τοῦ χωρίου.

- ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ· εἰ γὰρ ἐν χρειᾷ ὄντα ἡδίκησεν ἢ εὖ ἐποίησε, μέγα τὸ ἀδίκημα ἢ εὐεργέτημα.

- ἀπὸ τοῦ τρόπου, εἰ ῥαδίως ἢ χαλεπῶς, ἢ πειθοῖ ἢ βίᾳ· ἐκάτερον γὰρ αὐξήσεις, τὸ μὲν ὑπεροχὴν σημαίνειν τῆς τοῦ πεποιηκότος ἀνδρείας, τὸ δὲ τέχνης ὑπερβολὴν ἢ συνέσεως.

- ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης, <εἰ> ἔχοι τι θαυμαστὸν κατὰ τὰς ἀφορμὰς ἢ παράδοξον.

- ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας· εἰ γὰρ διὰ πρόφασιν γέγονε σφόδρα ἐπαινουμένην ἢ ψεγομένην, μέγα τὸ πραχθὲν, ὥσπερ ἡ κατάλυσις τῆς τυραννίδος δι' ἐλευθερίαν.

- ἀπὸ τῆς γνώμης, οἷον εἰ εὐνοῶν, ἢ δύνουσι ὦν.

ἀπὸ ποσότητος·

- κατὰ πρόσωπον, ὅτι εἰς πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ ὠφέλεια, ἢ βλάβη.

- κατὰ χρόνον, ὅτι εἰς πολλοὺς διατείνει χρόνους, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ καταλύσαντος τὴν τυραννίδα, ὅτι αἰδῖος ἢ εὐεργεσία· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔτι τυραννήσει, ἐκόντος τούτου τὴν τυραννίδα ἀπορρίψαντος.

- ἀπὸ ποσότητος κατὰ τὰ ἐπόμενα, ὅτι μεγάλα τὰ ἐπακολουθοῦντα καὶ πολλὰ·

¹⁶ ἐυδόξου Walz.

¹⁷ For the phrase cf. Hermogenes 44.8-10 (referring to the topics of encomium); but the supplement is, of course, very uncertain.

<ἀπὸ τῶν παρακολουθούντων τῷ προσώπῳ>

- ἀπὸ ιδιότητος, ὅταν λέγωμεν ὅτι πρῶτος ἢ μόνος τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐτόλμησεν, ὡς ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου· 'καὶ μὴν ὅτι πολλοὺς μὲν ἐστεφανώκατε ἤδη τῶν πολιτευομένων ἅπαντες ἴστε· δι' ὅντινα δὲ ἄλλον ἢ πόλις ἐστεφάνωνται, σύμβουλον λέγω καὶ ῥήτορα, πλὴν δι' ἐμέ, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς εἰπεῖν ἔχοιτε' [Dem. 18.94].

- ἀπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας, εἰ νέος ὢν ἢ γέρων, εἰ θαρραλέος ἢ εὐλαβής.
- ἀπὸ τῆς ἀξίας, εἰ ιδιώτης ἢ ἄρχων.
- ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως, εἰ γεωργὸς ἢ ἔμπορος.
- ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης, εἰ πένης ἢ πλούσιος.
- ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους, εἰ Ἑλλήν ἢ βάρβαρος.
- ἀπὸ φύσεως, εἰ ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή.

ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰκότος

- εἰ παρὰ¹⁸ τὸ εἰκὸς τοῦ τόπου ἢ πράξις πέπρακται, εἰ ὅπου μηδεὶς ἂν προσεδόκησεν.
- εἰ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς τοῦ καιροῦ, ὅτε μηδεὶς ὑπενόησεν.
- εἰ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς τοῦ τρόπου, ὅτι <οὐκ> εἰκὸς τοιῷδε τρόπῳ, ὃ ἐστὶ παραδόξῳ τρόπῳ· οἷον τέχναις, μηχαναῖς, λόγοις, δι' ὃν τις οὐ προσεδόκησε τρόπον.
- παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς τῆς αἰτίας, ὅτι τοιάδε αἰτία.

[522.12] φιλοτίμως μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς τοὺς τρόπους ὑπεξήλθομεν, ἀρκέσουσι δ' αἱ ἐπιχειρήσεις τῇ πηλικότητι αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐσομένου, ὅτ' ἂν πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα δεικνύειν ἔχωμεν τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, οἷον· 'δρινὸν τὸ τὰ ἱερὰ ἐπανοίγειν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς κλέπτειν, κἂν μὴ ἱερὰ τυγχάνῃ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἔξουσιν αἱ τῶν ιδιωτῶν παρακαταθήκαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀδικοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα, καταφρονηθήσεται τὰ ἱερά, ὑπεροφθήσεται ἡ εὐσέβεια, ἀπολείται τὰ παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν κειμήλια. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ οἱ νεῶ ἀξιόπιστα φυλακτήρια, τί περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις ταμιείων ὑποληψόμεθα;' ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλάττονος· 'ὅπου γάρ, εἰ καὶ ἀνέφξε μόνον, οὐκ ἂν ἐξέφυγε τὴν τῶν ἱεροσύλων αἰτίαν, σχολῇ γε νῦν ὁπότε πρὸς τῷ ἀνοίξαι καὶ ὑφείλετο'.

[522.25] αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνέξεσιν ἐκ τούτων· αἱ δὲ μειώσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.

F10 Anon. RG 7.235.4-21¹⁹

καὶ αὕτη μὲν ἡ διαφορὰ ἔνθα πάθος τι καὶ ἄδικος πράξις ὑπόκειται. ἔνθα δὲ μὴ τοῦτο (ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἀντιλήψει· Κλέωνος ἐπαγγελλομένου τὰ περὶ Πύλου Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐγέλα, καὶ κρίνεται ὕβρεως) ἑτέρα διαφορὰ ἡ κατὰ Πορφύριον· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀντιλήψει ὅλον τὸ πρᾶγμα συγκεχώρηται, ἐν δὲ τῇ μεταλήψει οὐχ ὅλον (οἷον τὸ γελᾶν Ἀλκιβιάδην κατὰ πάντα συγκεχώρηται καὶ χρόνον καὶ τόπον· τὸ δὲ ἀποκτινύναι τὸν πένητα κατάκριτον ὄντα οὐ συγκεχώρηται πάντῃ) ... κατὰ Παῦλον δὲ τὸν ἡμέτερον ἀκριβεστέραν διαφορὰν προσθετέον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μετάληψις ἀπὸ νόμου τινὸς

¹⁸ περὶ Walz.

¹⁹ Cf. Maximus Planudes RG 5.266.13-15.

ἀεὶ λαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ ἀντιλήψεως ἢ ἀπὸ ἔθους ἢ ἀπὸ φύσεως ἢ ἀπὸ νόμου. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ ἔθους οὐδὲ μία ἂν γένοιτο κοινωνία ὅλως, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ νόμου, ἔνθα κοινωνοῦσι μόνον, ἀπόχρη [οὖν] ἡ Πορφυρίου.

F11a Anon. *RG* 7.203.22-204.4

ἄμεινον δὲ ταύτην παρέντας τὴν Πορφυρίου διαφορὰν παραδέχεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ αὕτη· εἰ μὲν εἴη τὸ ἀδίκημα οἷον ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ γενέσθαι ἀλλὰ θεραπείας τετυχηκέναι τινός, μετάστασις γίνεται, οἷον νόμος τὸν πρεσβευτὴν εἴσω λ' ἡμερῶν ἐξιέναι λαβόντα παρὰ τοῦ ταμίου χιλίας δραχμὰς εἰς ἐφόδιον, μὴ λαβὼν τις καὶ καταμείνας κρίνεται· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀδίκημα, δυναμένου τοῦ πρεσβευτοῦ ἢ δανείσασθαι ἢ οἰκεῖα ἐχόντα ἐφόδια ἐξελεῖν. ἐὰν δὲ ἡ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἑτέρως γεγενῆσθαι, συγγνώμην ποιεῖ, οἷον χειμῶνος ἐπιλαβόντος οὐκ ἀνείλοντο οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν πεσόντων ἐν Ἀργινοῦσαις κατὰ τὴν μάχην καὶ κρίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἡδύναντό τινα θεραπείαν προσάγειν τῷ ἐκ χειμῶνος κωλύματι.

F11b Christophorus fol. 101v-102r²⁰

ὁ δὲ Πορφύριος ταύτην λέγει διαφορὰν, ὅτι εἰ μὲν εἴη τὸ ἀδίκημα οἷον ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ γεγενῆσθαι ἀλλὰ θεραπείας τετυχηκέναι τινός, μετάστασις γίνεται, οἷον ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ πρεσβευτοῦ· δυνατόν γὰρ ἦν ἀλλαχόθεν αὐτὸν λαβόντα ἐφόδια πρεσβεῦσαι. ἐὰν δὲ ἡ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἑτέρως γεγενῆσθαι ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πραχθῆναι τὸ πραχθέν, συγγνώμην ποιεῖ, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ἀνελομένων δέκα στρατηγῶν τὰ τῶν πεσόντων σώματα τοῦ χειμῶνος διαλαβόντος· οὐ γὰρ ἦν δυνατόν τινα θεραπείαν προσάγειν τῷ ἐκ χειμῶνος κωλύματι. ταύτη συνήνεσεν Εὐστάθιος.

F11c Maximus Planudes *RG* 5.261.1-4

ὁ δὲ Πορφύριος φησιν ὡς εἰ μὲν εἴη τὸ ἀδίκημα οἷον ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ γεγενῆσθαι ἀλλὰ θεραπείας τετυχηκέναι τινός, μετάστασις γίνεται· ἐὰν δὲ ἡ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἑτέρως γεγενῆσθαι, συγγνώμην ἐτι ζητοῦσι.

F12a Anon. *RG* 7.596.14-20²¹

τοῦτο δὲ ἔφην ἐπεὶ τινες καὶ ἕτερα κεφάλαια τῆς πραγματικῆς παρειλήφασιν, ὧν τοὺς μὲν ἀσημοτέρους παραπέμψομαι ἐπιχειρήματά τινα λίαν εὐθῆως εἰς τὴν κεφαλαίων παραλαβόντας τάξιν, Πορφυρίου δὲ ποιήσομαι μνήμην, ὅς ἐν τοῖς κεφαλαίοις τῆς πραγματικῆς τὴν τε πληκτικότητα καὶ τὸ πρὸς τι ἀπηριθμήσατο.

²⁰ Rabe (1895) 247; Schilling (1903) 731.

²¹ Cf. Maximus Planudes *RG* 5.346.20-22.

F12b Georgius fol. 214v²²

ἄλλοι δέ, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ Μητροφάνης τε καὶ Πορφύριος, ἐμπίπτειν φασὶν ἐν τῇ πραγματικῇ τὰ ἀνζητικά δύο κεφάλαια, τὴν πηλικότητά τέ φημι καὶ τὸ πρὸς τι.

F13a Marcellinus *RG* 4.268.16-269.1

δεῖ τὰ δύο ῥήτῃ ἐν ἀντινομία κεκυρωμένα εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ εἶπον ἐπειδὴ συμβαίνει τὸ μὲν ἐν πάλαι κεκυρωθῆναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν νῦν εἰσάγεσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ ἀντινομίαν, ἀλλὰ πραγματικὴν, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πορφύριος. οἷον νόμος ἐκέλευε ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις περὶ πολέμου βουλευέσθαι, Ἐλάτειαν κατελιηφότος Φιλίππου γράφει Δημοσθένης αὐθημερὸν ἐξιέναι, Αἰσχίνης ἀντιλέγει. ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ὁ μὲν νόμος κεκύρωται, τὸ δὲ εἰσφερόμενον ψήφισμα δοκιμασθῆναι δεῖ. ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ Πορφύριος ἀγνοεῖν τὴν διαφορὰν πραγματικῆς τῆς κατὰ ἀντινομίαν καὶ ἀντινομίας αὐτῆς· ἔστι γὰρ ὅτε καὶ ἡ πραγματικὴ κεκυρωμένους ἔχει τοὺς δύο νόμους, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τῇ ἀντινομίᾳ ἐπὶ ἥδη παραβεβασμένῳ νόμῳ ἡ κρίσις, ἐν δὲ τῇ πραγματικῇ βουλῇ ἐστὶ καὶ σκέψις τίνα μὲν δεῖ παραβῆναι τῶν νόμων, ποῖον δὲ ἑᾶσαι κεκυρωμένον.

F13b Nilus fol. 170v²³

καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἡ ἀντινομία ἀπὸ δύο ῥητῶν κεκυρωμένων θέλει εἶναι.

F14 Sopater *Division of Questions* 381.29-382.2

εἶτα ἡ πηλικότης, ὅτι δεινὸν ἡ πληγὴ. καὶ ἐρεῖς πάντα τὰ τὴν πηλικότητα κατασκευάζοντα ἐπιχειρήματα. ταῦτα δὲ φανερά ἐκ τῶν ὀρικῶν καὶ τῆς Πορφυρίου τέχνης.

F15 'Metrophanes, Athanasius, Porphyry, and Polemo' *RG* 4.422.18-429.5²⁴

[422.18] τινές φασι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὠρίσθαι τοὺς ἐπιλόγους δευτερολογίαν [cf. Hermogenes 52.6f.], ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπίλογος ἔστι λόγος ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἐπιλεγόμενος, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δευτερολογίαις εὐρίσκεται καὶ ἄλλα κεφάλαια καὶ ἐπιχειρήματα.

[422.22] 'γίνεται δὲ ἐν παντί' [Hermogenes 52.7]· ἐπειδὴ πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων ἡ κοινὴ ποιότης, οὐ μόνον τῶν στοχαστικῶν, εἰκότως ἐν τῷ στοχασμῷ πᾶσαν αὐτῆς²⁵ ποιεῖται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, ἵνα κὰν ταῖς λοιπαῖς μὴ ἀγνοῶμεν. προϋπέθετο²⁶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἄνω, τὰ τοῦ στοχασμοῦ κεφάλαια καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας στάσεις συντελεῖν.

²² Schilling (1903) 751f.

²³ Gloeckner (1901) 77.

²⁴ For the attribution see Rabe (1909) 588; Walz presents this section as part of the extract from Marcellinus beginning at 417.1.

²⁵ αὐτῆς Py (Kowalski (1947) 123); αὐτοῦ Walz (422.24)

²⁶ προϋπέθετο Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 59); προυτίθετο Walz (422.25).

[422.27] ἐπίλογος δέ ἐστι
λόγος ἐπὶ προειρημέναις ἀποδείξεσιν
ἐπιλεγόμενος, ἀθροισμὸν πραγμάτων
καὶ ἡθῶν καὶ παθῶν περιέχων

ἢ ἐπάνοδος εἰρημένων,²⁷
ἢ
λόγος ἐπιρρωννύων τὰ εἰρημένα.

ἐπίλογός ἐστιν, ὡς μὲν Νεοκλῆς,
λόγος ἐπὶ προειρημέναις ἀποδείξεσιν
ἐπιλεγόμενος, πραγμάτων ἀθροισμὸν
καὶ ἡθῶν καὶ παθῶν περιέχων.
ὡς δέ τινες, μέρος λόγου ὕστατον
ἐπόμενον ἀποδείξεσιν.

ὡς δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος,
λόγος ἐπιρρωννύς τὰ εἰρημένα.
[Anon. Seg. 198-200]

[422.30] κατὰ δὲ Μινουκιανὸν λόγος δεινῶσιν ἢ μείωσιν ἔχων τῶν
πεπραγμένων, ἢ λόγος γνῶσιν ἔχων τῶν πεπραγμένων, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ
καλουμένη διατύπωσις ἢ διασκευὴ πάθος κινουῖσα καὶ πρὸς ἐναργεῖ τῶν
πεπραγμένων ἐξέτασιν τὸν δικαστὴν ἄγουσα. ἔχουσι δὲ οἱ ἐπίλογοι καὶ
παρακλήσεις καὶ ἀνακεφαλαιώσεις καὶ ἐπιδιηγήσεις.

[423.3] ἔργον δὲ ἐπιλόγου κατὰ
Πλάτωνα²⁸ ἐν Φαίδρῳ [267d].
ἐν κεφαλαίῳ λέγοντα
ὑπομνήσαι ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοὺς
ἀκούοντας·

δεύτερον τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν·

τρίτον, ἀναμιμνήσκειν τὰ
εἰρημένα.

[423.7] εἰσφέρονται δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν
κατηγόρων τοπικῶς μετὰ τὰς
ἀποδείξεις κατατρεχόντων·

ἔργον δὲ ἐπιλόγου
Πλάτων μὲν ἐν Φαίδρῳ φησὶν [267d].
ἔν κεφαλαίῳ καταλέγοντα
ὑπομνήσαι ἐπιτελευτικούς τοὺς
ἀκούοντας τῶν εἰρημένων.
ἔχεται δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ
Χρύσιππος· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς μονομερῆ
φησι τὸν ἐπίλογον. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ
ἐν ταῖς Θεοδεκτικαῖς τέχναις φησὶν,
ὅτι ὁ ἐπίλογος τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον
ἔχει προτρέψασθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας·
προτρέψομεν δὲ τριχῶς, εἰς τὰ πάθη
ἀνάγοντες τὰ ἐκάστω προτρεπτικά.
ἐν μὲν οὖν ἔργον ἐπιλόγου τὸ τὰ
πάθη διεγείρει,

δεύτερον τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν·
τούτων γὰρ ἐν ἐπιλόγοις ἡ χώρα·
τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκειν τὰ
εἰρημένα. [Anon. Seg. 207-8]

ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν
κατηγόρων τοπικῶς μετὰ τὰς
ἀποδείξεις κατατρεχόντων
τοῦ ἐγκλήματος, οἷον κατὰ τυράννου
ἢ πόρνου ἢ ὅ τι ἂν ᾖ τὸ ἐγκλημα,
καὶ ἐπανακεφαλαιουμένων γε
ἕκαστα τῶν ἐπικαίρων, ὡς ὁ
Δημοσθένης, οἷον ὅτι συλλογίσασθαι δὴ

²⁷ Cf. Aelius Aristides 4.21; Longinus *Rhetoric* 48.86 Patillon.

²⁸ πλείονα Walz: corr. Finckh.

ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν φευγόντων,
ἀνακεφαλαιουμένων μὲν
ὁμοίως, οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ
χρωμένων, ἀλλ' ἐλεεινολογουμένων
καὶ πάθη κινούντων.²⁹

βούλομαι τὰ κατηγορημένα·
ἀπέδειξα μὴδὲν ἀληθές
ἀπηγγελκότα, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς [Dem.
19.177]· ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν φευγόντων
ἀνακεφαλαιουμένων μὲν καὶ αὐτῶν
ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ
χρωμένων, ἀλλ' ἐλεεινολογουμένων
τε καὶ πάθη κινούντων.³⁰ [Hermogenes
52.8-17]

[423.10] ὀρθῶς δὲ μαθὼν ὁ Πλάτων τὴν τῶν ἐλέων καὶ παθῶν διοίκησιν, δι' ἐνὸς ὀνόματος ἐδήλωσεν ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ, τὰ ἐλεεινὰ εἰπὼν ταῦτα δράματα [Apology 35b]. ἔδοξε μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, παραιτεῖσθαι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρέπειν ἀνδρὶ φιλοσόφῳ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀρετῆς ἥκοντι δι' ἐλέου καὶ οἴκτου πορίζεσθαι τὴν σωτηρίαν, σχεδὸν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ παρήγαγε θαυμαστῇ καὶ σφόδρα ῥητορικῇ μεθόδῳ χρησάμενος, δι' ἧς καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα ἐξῆρε τὸ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος περιγινόμενην ὠφέλειαν οὐ παρητήσατο, ἐκατέρῳ τὸ ἴδιον ἀπονείμας, φιλοσοφία μὲν τὸ σεμνόν, ῥητορικῇ δὲ τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οἰκεῖον. ὥς ἀγανακτήσαντα γὰρ τινὰ τῶν δικαζόντων ὑποθέμενος διὰ τί ὑπερηφανία κατ' αὐτῶν χρώμενος τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐλέου παρητήσατο κρίσιν, εἰπὼν· 'τάχα ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν [cf. 34b], εἰ μὴ μετὰ παιδῶν καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ πολλῶν δακρύων ἰκετεύω, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ποιῶ· ἀλλ' εἰσί μοί φησι καὶ υἱεῖς [cf. 34d], ἀλλ' οὐ συμφέρει πρὸς δόξαν οὔτε ἐμοὶ οὔτε τῇ πόλει τοιαῦτα παθεῖν [cf. 34e]· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ἐν ἀξιώματι ἐλεεινολογεῖσθαι—ὥς οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν κατὰ ἀπόκρισιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπέβαλε τὰ εἰς ἔλεον κινούντα τοὺς δικάζοντας εἰπὼν· 'τάχα ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τούτου τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθεῖ καὶ ἄλλους φίλους καὶ οἰκείους, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα²⁹ τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὥς ἂν δόξαιμι³⁰, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον' καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς [34bc]· εἴτα ἐπήγαγε τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀξιώματος τῇ μεθόδῳ· 'τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιαζόμενος, ὅθεν οὐδ' ὑμᾶς³¹ ἀτιμάζων' καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ [34d].

[424.9] καὶ τοῦ μὲν φεύγοντος τὸ ἐλεεινολογεῖσθαι ἴδιον, τὸν δὲ κατήγορον δεῖ ταῦτα ἐκβάλλειν. πολλάκις γὰρ ὁ ἔλεος τῆς κατηγορίας τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐκλύει. καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο μεγίστην ἔχει δύναμιν, ἐντεῦθεν γνोίημεν· ὁ γὰρ Καλλίξενος οὐκ ἄλλω τινὶ ἔπεισεν Ἀθηναίους καταψηφίσασθαι τῶν στρατηγῶν θάνατον ἢ τῷ τοὺς οἰκείους τῶν τετελευτηκότων μελανειμονοῦντας εἰσάγειν καὶ δακρύοντας καὶ ἰκετηρίας ἔχοντας· οὕτω γὰρ ἰσχυρόν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον, ὥστε καὶ τῆς αἰτίας προδήλου οὔσης δι' ἣν οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τὰ σώματα, ὅμως οὐκ ἐφείσαντο

²⁹ ἄρα Py (Kowalski (1947) 130); ἄρα Walz (424.5).

³⁰ δόξαιμι Plato Ap. 34c. δείξαιμι Py (Kowalski (1947) 140: 'fort. δείξαίμην'); δείξαι μοι Walz (424.6).

³¹ οὐδ' ὑμᾶς Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 70); οὐδαμῶς Walz (424.9).

καταψηφίσασθαι τῶν στρατηγῶν οὕτω λαμπρὰν καὶ μεγίστην ναυμαχίαν νενινηκότων. δεῖ οὖν καὶ τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἰσχυρᾶς τῷ κατηγορῶ. τί οὖν ποιήσει; ἀντιτάξει³² ταῖς ἐλεεινολογίαις τὰ τελικὰ κεφάλαια.

[424.23] ἔστι δὲ κοινὴ τῶν δύο προσώπων ἡ κοινὴ ποιότης.

[424.24] εἰδέναι μέντοι δεῖ, ὥς συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐπιλεῖψαι τὸν ἐπίλογον, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τὸ προοίμιον καὶ τὴν διήγησιν, ὥς ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι μόνον εἶναι τὸ ζήτημα.

ἵνα δὲ μὴ θαυμάσῃ τις, εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ προοίμιον καὶ τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον παραλείπεσθαι καὶ ἐν ἀποδείξεσι μόναις εἶναι τὸ ζήτημα, παραθησόμεθα τι τοιοῦτον· φέρε γὰρ ἐν σταδίῳ δρομεῖς δύο ἀμφισβητεῖν, τὸν μὲν εἰς τοὺς ὕσπληγας πρότερον εἰσπεσόντα, τὸν δὲ τὸ βραβεῖον κεκομισμένον· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὔτε τοῦ προοιμίου χρεῖα οὔτε τῆς διηγήσεως οὔτε ἐπιλόγου, ἀλλὰ μόνης ἀποδείξεως. [Anon. Seg. 202]

[424.27] προνοητέον δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις, ὅπως ἐὰν μὲν κατηγορῶμεν δυσμενῇ τῷ φεύγοντι τὸν ἀκροατὴν ποιήσωμεν³³, ἐὰν δὲ ἀπολογώμεθα εὖνουν ἑαυτοῖς τὸν δικαστὴν καταστήσωμεν.

προνοητέον δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις, ὅπως ἐὰν κατηγορῶμεν δύσνουν τὸν ἀκροατὴν ποιήσωμεν τῷ φεύγοντι, ἐὰν δὲ ἀπολογώμεθα εὖνουν ἑαυτοῖς τὸν ἀκροατὴν καταλείψωμεν. [Anon. Seg. 235]

[424.30] φησὶ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης [*Rhetoric* 1419b10-13] τέσσαρα εἶναι μέρη τοῦ ἐπιλόγου· πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἰς πάθος ἄγειν τὸν ἀκροατὴν· ἔπειτα τὸ ποιῆσαι τοῖς μὲν ἐναντίοις ἄλλοτρίως ἔχειν, αὐτοῖς δὲ οἰκείως· καὶ τὸ αὔξειν καὶ ταπεινοῦν· καὶ τελευταῖον τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκειν. πολλάκις δὲ οὐ πᾶσι χρηστέον ἀλλ' ἐνίοις.

[425.3] διάφοροι δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀνακεφαλαιώσεων μέθοδοι παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις. καὶ γὰρ

- ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλάσματος κέχρηνται ὥς Ὑπερίδης· βουλόμενος γὰρ τὰ λεχθέντα ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι ἐν πλάσματι εἰσήγαγεν.

- ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας, ὥς παρὰ τῷ Πλάτῳ ἐν Φαίδρῳ ἐπὶ ταῖς προκειμέναις αἰτίαις δι' ἃς εὐλόγως τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπομιμνήσκει.

- ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας, ὥς πρότερον ἐπαγγελιάμενοι ἐν κεφαλαίῳ τὰ ἐπαγγελθέντα πληροῦν ἐθέλομεν, ὥς ἔχομεν ἐν τῷ παραπρεσβείας· ὁ συλλογίσασθαι δὴ βούλομαι τὰ κατηγορημένα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἵν' ὅσα ὑπεσχόμεν ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου δείξω πεποιηκώς' [19.177].

- ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀντεξετάσεως, ὥς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ Δημοσθένους. πρὸς ἑτέρους γὰρ ἀντεξετάζων πρεσβευτὰς [19.278] ἀναγκαίαν τῆς

³² ποιήσει; ἀντιτάξει Py (Kowalski 1940-6) 72; ποιήσεις; ἀντιτάξεις Walz (424.22f.).

³³ ποιήσωμεν Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 53); om. Walz (424.29).

ἀνακεφαλαιώσεως τὴν εἰσαγωγὴν ἐποίησατο, ὥς ἤδη εἰρήκαμεν.

- ἡ κατ' ἐρώτησιν, ἣν καὶ δαιμονίαν ὁ ῥήτωρ παρέσχετο ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφάνου. βουλευθεὶς γὰρ πάντα ἐν κεφαλαίῳ διεξελεῖν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐγκώμια, ἐπειδὴ ἐπαχθὲς ἦν³⁴ τοῦτο τοῖς ἀκούουσι, τὴν τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἐξεῦρε μέθοδον, καθ' ἣν πομπικῶς ἅμα καὶ μετ' ἐργασίας ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπαχθὲς ἔμελλε τὴν ἑαυτῷ προσοῦσαν ἀρετὴν διεξιέναι καὶ κατὰ ἀνάγκην λέγων φαίνεσθαι. ὥς ἐρωτῶντα γὰρ πεποίηκε τὸν Αἰσχίνην εἰσάγων οὕτως· εἶτα μ' ἐρωτᾷς ἀντὶ ποίας ἀρετῆς ἀξιῶ τιμᾶσθαι; ἐγὼ δέ σοι λέγω ὅτι τῶν πολιτευομένων παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσι διαφθαρέντων ἀρξαμένων ἀπὸ σοῦ πρώτου, πρότερον μὲν ὑπὸ Φιλίππου, νῦν δ' ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ἐμὲ οὔτε καιρὸς οὔτ' ἀλλ' ὁτιοῦν ἔπεισεν' [18.297f.].

- ἔστι καὶ ἀπὸ συγχωρήσεως ἐπὶ τῷ κατὰ διορισμὸν σχήματι, ὅταν τοῦ ἀντιδίκου εἰς ἕτερον μεθιστάντος, περὶ μὲν τούτου μὴ ἀκριβολογώμεθα, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὀριζώμεθα ἐφ' οἷς τὴν κατηγορίαν ποιοῦμεθα, ὥς ἐν τῷ κατ' Αἰσχίνου Δημοσθένους· Αἰσχίνου γὰρ ἄγοντος ἐπὶ Χάρητα τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ὥς στρατηγόν, περὶ μὲν τούτου οὐδὲν ἔφη δισχυρίζεσθαι, εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα λεληθότως ἀπολογεῖται ὑπὲρ Χάρητος, ὥς πάντα ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως πράξαντος, ὥριστο δὲ ἐφ' οἷς Αἰσχίνου κατηγορεῖ εἰπών· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδὲν Αἰσχίνην αἰτιῶμαι τούτων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πραχθέντων (τούτων γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ὑπεύθυνοι), οὐδ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὴν πόλιν εἰρήνην, ἀλλ' ἄχρι τούτου πάντα ἀφίημι· εἶτα διορισμός· τί οὖν λέγω καὶ πόθεν ἄρχομαι κατηγορεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς [19.333].

εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι μέθοδοι ἀνακεφαλαιώσεων ἃς παραφυλάττειν χρὴ ὁρῶντας τὴν μεταχείρησιν καθ' ἣν ἐκάστη εἰσῆκται, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐπικαίρους τῶν μεταχειρήσεων δηλοῦντας, τὰς δὲ ἀπλῶς εἰσηγμένας παραιτεῖσθαι.

[426.17] χρηστέον δὲ τῇ

ἀνακεφαλαιώσει ὅταν πολλὰ τὰ
εἰρημένα ᾖ, ὥστε <μὴ>³⁵ μεμνήσθαι
τοὺς ἀκούοντας·
ὅταν δὲ ὀλίγα ᾖ,
παραλείπομεν.

ὅταν μὲν οὖν πολλὰ ᾖ τὰ
εἰρημένα, ὥστε μὴ μεμνήσθαι
τοὺς ἀκούοντας, τῇ ἀναμνήσει
χρησόμεθα· ὅταν δὲ ὀλίγα,
παραλείπομεν τὴν ἀνάμνησιν. [Anon.
Seg. 204]

[426.19] εὐρήσομεν δὲ διαφόρως τοὺς παλαιοὺς τὴν ἀνακεφαλαιώσιν ποιησαμένους.

[426.20] πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τέλους
ἐχρήσαντο αὐτῇ, ὥς

ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τέλους
εἰσὶν αὐτῇ κεχρημένοι, ὥς
καὶ ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ τῇ Δημάδου
ἐποίησεν ὁ Ὑπερίδης,
καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατὰ
Ἀριστοκράτους καὶ Τιμοκράτους.
ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέσον

ἐν τῷ κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους καὶ ἐν
τῷ κατὰ Τιμοκράτους ὁ Δημοσθένης,
πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ,

³⁴ ἦν Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 52); om. Walz (425.20).

³⁵ Suppl. Graeven.

ὥς
ἐν τῷ παραπρεσβείας.
ἐχρήσαντο δὲ αὐτῇ καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν
προηγούμενων καὶ ἀναγκαίων
πίστεων.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος
ἀνακεφαλαιώσεως τρόπος,
ἐπὶ ἐνὶ κεφαλαίῳ γενόμενος.

ταύτη δὲ διαφέρουσι
αἱ ἀνακεφαλαιώσεις ἀλλήλων, ὅτι ἡ
μὲν ἐπὶ τέλους τοῦ λόγου
ἔκθεσιν ἔχει κεφαλαιώδη,

ἡ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀνάμνησιν
ἔχει³⁶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων πίστεων,
ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ ἐνὶ κεφαλαίῳ
γινομένη οὐκέτι κεφαλαίων
ἀνάμνησιν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ λημμάτων δι'
ᾧν ἀπεδείχθη τὸ προκείμενον
κεφάλαιον.

[426.31]
δεῖ δὲ ἀνακεφαλαιοῦσθαι τὰ
ἰσχυρότερα,

παραλιμπάνειν δὲ τὰ σαθρότερα,
ὥς ἔφαμεν,
καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἀναγκαιότερα
ὁμοίως παραλείπειν.

τοῦ λόγου ἐχρήσαντο τῇ ἀναμνήσει,
τουτέστι τῇ ἀνακεφαλαιώσει,
ὥς ἀμέλει καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Δημοσθένης
ἐν τῷ παραπρεσβείας.
ἕτεροι δὲ ἤδη μεταξὺ τῶν
ὑποειρημένων καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων
πίστεων ἀνέμνησαν τῶν
προηγούμενων ἀποδείξεων
κεφαλαιωδῶς μέλλοντες περὶ τῶν
ἀναγκαίων διαλέγεσθαι.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἕτερος
τόπος τῆς ἀναμνήσεως ἡ γιγνώμενος
ἐπὶ ἐνὶ ἀποδειχθέντι κεφαλαίῳ,
οἷον ...

τρεις οὖν ἔχει τόπους ἡ ἀνάμνησις,
τουτέστιν ἡ ἀνακεφαλαιώσις, τὸν
ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ λόγου, τὸν μεταξὺ
γιγνώμενον τῶν τε ἀναγκαίων καὶ
τῶν προηγούμενων ἀποδείξεων, καὶ
τὸν γινώμενον ἐπὶ ἐνὶ κεφαλαίῳ
ἀποδεδειγμένῳ.

ταύτη δὲ διαφέρουσιν
ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀναμνήσεις, ὅτι ἡ
μὲν ἐπὶ τέλει γινομένη τοῦ λόγου
ἔκθεσιν ἔχει κεφαλαιώδη τῶν
ζητημάτων ἀπάντων καὶ ἀνάμνησιν
τῶν προηγούμενων ἀποδείξεων
κεφαλαιωδῶς καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων,
ἡ δὲ μεταξὺ γιγνώμενη ἀνάμνησιν
περιέχει τῶν ἀναγκαίων πίστεων,
ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ ἐνὶ ἀποδειχθέντι
γινομένη οὐκ ἔτι κεφαλαίων
ἀνάμνησις, ἀλλὰ τῶν λημμάτων δι'
ᾧν ἀπεδείχθη τὸ προκείμενον
κεφάλαιον. [‘Apsines’ 10.3.3-30 Patillon]³⁷

ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντα
ἀνακεφαλαιωσόμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὅσα μὲν
ἰσχυρῶς ἐσμεν λευκότες, ταῦτα
ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι προσήκει,
τὰ δὲ σαθρὰ παραλιπεῖν.

οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τῶν
ἀντιδίκων κεφάλαια πάντοτε

³⁶ ἔχει Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 53); om. Walz (426.28).

³⁷ The textual problems in this passage are discussed in Heath (2002) 662-67.

ἀναμνήσομεν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα, ἃ τὴν
ἀνάμνησιν ἀναγκαίαν ἔχει καὶ ἡμῖν
χρήσιμον. [Anon. Seg. 212]

[427.2] εὗρε δὲ καὶ ἄλλην Δημοσθένης καινότεραν ἀνακεφαλαίωσιν, τοῖς
πρέσβεσιν ἀντιτάξας τοὺς πρέσβεις, καὶ γράμματα γράμμασιν· ἔπειδὴ
παρὰ τὰ γράμματά, φησιν, ἐπρέσβευσαν· οὗτοι δὲ οὐ παρὰ τὰ γράμματα;³⁷
[19.278].

[427.6] τότε δὲ δεῖ χρήσασθαι τῇ ἐργασίᾳ τοῦ κοινοῦ τόπου, ὅταν ἢ τοῦ
τιμήματος ἐξουσία περὶ τοῦ τί χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ³⁸ ἀποτίσαι τοῖς δικάζουσι
καταλίπηται.

[427.8] πολλακίς δὲ τὸ παθητικὸν	καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν δὲ μέρος ὡσαύτως· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα πάθος εἴη, τότε κινήσομεν·
παρήσομεν, ὅταν μὴ ἔχη τὸ πρᾶγμα πάθος.	ὅταν δὲ μὴ [εἴη], παρήσομεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ ὀλίγα καὶ εὐμνημόνευτα εἰ πάλιν ἀναμνήσομεν, γελοῖον ποιήσομεν, οὕτως καὶ τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα πάθος ἂν παθαίνειν πειρασώμεθα, ἀπορήσαντες τοῦ τοιούτου γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα. [Anon.Seg. 205]

[427.10] 'κοινὰ δὲ ἀμφοῖν τὰ τελικὰ λεγόμενα κεφάλαια' [Hermogenes 52.19f.]·
τελικὰ δὲ εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπὶ τέλει τῶν λόγων τίθεται ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ
τόπῳ, ἢ ὅτι ἐν ἑκαστῷ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ³⁹ τέλειον ἔχει, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ
τὰ ἄλλα ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου κατασκευάζεται, ὥσπερ ἢ τῶν ἐλέγχων
ἀπαίτησις ἐκ τῶν σημείων· ἢ ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα πάντα κεφάλαια καὶ ἀπλῶς
εἰπεῖν πάντα τὰ πράγματα εἰς ταῦτα συντείνει (ἢ γὰρ ὡς νόμιμόν τι, ἢ ὡς
συμφέρον, ἢ ὡς δίκαιον, ἢ ὡς ἔνδοξον, ἢ ὡς τι τούτων προβαλλόμεθα).

[427.20] χρήσεται δὲ τούτοις ὁ μὲν φεύγων λέγων ὅτι 'συμφέρει ὑμῖν τὸ μὴ
τοῖς συκοφάνταις προσέχειν καὶ πείθεσθαι· οὗτοι γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ τὰ κοινὰ
διαφθείροντες', καὶ ὅτι 'εὖορκα παρέξεται, εἰ μὴ ἀδίκως ἐμοῦ
καταψηφιείσθε.' ὁ δὲ κατήγορος ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὅταν ὁ φεύγων εἰσάγῃ⁴⁰
παῖδας καὶ ἔλεον, πειράσεται ταῦτα ἄκυρα ποιεῖν τοῖς τελικοῖς
κεφαλαίοις.

[427.25] 'ἂφ' ὧν περ καὶ τὰ προοίμια' [Hermogenes 53.1f.]· δόξει ἀκαίρως ὁ
τεχνικὸς ἐνταῦθα προοιμίων μεμνήσθαι. ἀλλὰ φαμεν ὅτι περὶ ἐπιλόγων
διαλεγόμενος, ἐπειδὴ πολλὴν εἶδε συγγένειαν ἐπιλόγων καὶ προοιμίων (ἀπὸ
γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφοτέρω κατασκευάζεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερα
ἐπιγίνεται⁴¹) ἀναγκαίως διὰ τοῦτο μέμνηται διαφορᾶς, χωρίσαι τῆς
κοινωνίας βουλόμενος· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ ἢ ἔλεον ἢ φθόνον ἢ πάθος κινεῖ·

³⁷ ἢ Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 54); om. Walz (427.8).

³⁸ τὸ Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 57); om. Walz (427.14)

⁴⁰ εἰσάγῃ Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 74); εἰσάγει Walz (427.23).

⁴¹ ἐπεύγεται Py.

ἀμέλει Δημοσθένης ὀργὴν ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ προοιμίου κινεῖ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Μειδίου κατηγορῶν ἀσέλγειαν Μειδίου [21.1]. τοῦτο δὲ κὰν τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις ποιεῖ καταδρομὰς τοπικὰς ἐργαζόμενος.

[428.4] διάφορον δὲ αὐτῶν

τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ἡ ἐρμηνεία τοῦ λόγου.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ προοιμίου σχήματα
μέτρια εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἥπια καὶ ὥς ἂν
τις εἴποι τιθασσά·
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ νήφουσι μᾶλλον
οἱ ἀκροαταί, καὶ οὐπω ἀνακεκίνηται
αὐτῶν τὸ πάθος, ὁμοιοπαθεῖν δεῖ
τοῖς ἀκούουσι καὶ ἡρέμα
προβιβάζειν⁴³ τὸ τε ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὸ
τῶν ἀκροατῶν πάθος· ἔστι⁴⁴ δὲ τοῦτο
ἐὰν τοῖς τε σχήμασι μετρίοις καὶ
ταῖς λέξεσι καὶ ταῖς συνθέσεσιν, ἔτι
δὲ καὶ ταῖς ὑποκρίσεσιν μετρίαις
χρώμεθα·

ὁ δὲ ἐπίλογος τοῦναντίον
κεκινήσθαι τοῖς σχήμασιν ὀφείλει
καὶ πολλὰς μὲν ἐκβοήσεις ἔχειν,
πολλοὺς δὲ σχετλιασμούς·
καὶ τὰ μὲν προοίμια συστροφὴν ἔχει
τῆς λέξεως, ὁ δὲ ἐπίλογος
λελυμένην τὴν φράσιν.⁴⁵

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑλική τις ἔστι
διαφορά. πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ
προοιμίῳ λεχθέντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη
λέγειν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις
(οἷον ὑποπτεύεται τις διὰ περιεργίαν
ἢ διὰ πολυπραγμοσύνην
εἰσερχόμενος τοὺς ἀγῶνας· λυθείσης
τῆς ὑποψίας ἐν τῷ προοιμίῳ οὐκ ἔτι
ἀνάγκη ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις περὶ
τούτου λέγειν),
καὶ ἄλλαι τινές εἰσι προοιμιακαὶ

διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ἐπιλόγου τὸ
προοίμιον, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ προοιμίῳ
τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν ἐρμηνείαν
μέτριον εἶναι δεῖ καὶ <ἥπιαν>⁴²
τιθασσὸν ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις,

ἐν δ' ἐπιλόγοις τὸ σχῆμα
συγκεκινημένον
καὶ πολλὰς μὲν ἐμβοήσεις ἔχον,
πολλοὺς δὲ σχετλιασμούς,

τὴν τε ἐρμηνείαν συγκειμένην ἐκ
τροπικῆς μᾶλλον καὶ σημειώδους
λέξεως, δυναμένης μέντοι πεσεῖν εἰς
πολιτικούς λόγους.

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτῳ
διαφέρει, ὅτι πολλὰ τῶν ἐν τοῖς
προοιμίοις οὐκέτ'
ἐν ἐπιλόγοις λεκτέον.

οὐ μόνον δὲ τῶν προοιμίων εἰσὶ

⁴² ἥπιαν add. Anon. Seg. 237 (see below).

⁴³ προσβιβάζειν RG 7.347.5.

⁴⁴ ἔσται RG 7.347.5.

⁴⁵ This section (from 428.6 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ to 428.16 λελυμένην τὴν φράσιν) is also found in RG 7.347.2-12.

ὑλαι, αἵτινες ὅταν διαπεραιωθῶσιν
ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις, περιττὸν
ποιοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις τὸν περὶ
ἑαυτῶν λόγον.

εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις ὑλαι
τινὲς αἷς ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις οὐ
χρώμεθα
(οἷον περὶ τῶν κεφαλαίων οὐκ ἔχει
καλῶς τὸ τὰς ὑπολήψεις ἐν τοῖς
προοιμίοις λαμβάνειν·
ἐλκοποιήσομεν γὰρ τὸ προοίμιον),
ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις ἀνάγκη λαβεῖν
τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἐπίρρωσιν.

διαφέρει οὖν,

ὅτι τὸ μὲν πάθος παρασκευάζει,
ὁ δὲ ἐπίλογος αὖξει.

τινες ὑλαι, αἷς οὐ χρώμεθα
ἐν <τοῖς> ἐπιλόγοις,

ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐπιλόγων, ὧν οὐκ
ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις
χρεία.

ποιήσομεν τὸ προοίμιον, εἰ τῶν
κεφαλαίων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐν
τούτοις τὰς ὑπολήψεις ληψόμεθα,

ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ἔν
τι λαμβάνειν αὐτῶν εἰς ἐπίρρωσιν
ἢ παραίτησιν. [Anon. Seg. 19-20, cf. 237]

διαφέρει δὲ ὁ ἐπίλογος τοῦ
προοιμίου καὶ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν καὶ
κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν· κατὰ μὲν τὴν
λέξιν, ὅτι ἐν ἐκείνῳ μὲν μετρίαν
εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἡπίαν, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ
συγκεκινημένην καὶ πολλὰς
ἐμβοήσεις ἔχουσιν καὶ
σχετλιασμούς· κατὰ δὲ τὴν
διάνοιαν,

ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν πάθος ἐμποιῆσαι δεῖ,
ἐνταῦθα δὲ προὔπον αὖξῆσαι καὶ
ἐπιρρῶσαι. [Anon. Seg. 237]

[428.30] ὁ δὲ φεύγων πειράσεται ἐν μὲν τοῖς προοιμίοις μειῶσαι τὸ πάθος
καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν (ἄτοπον γὰρ πάντῃ ἀναιρεῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸ τῶν
ἀποδείξεων), ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις μετὰ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναιρεῖν καὶ
διαρρήδην ἐκβάλλειν ἐπιχειρήσει.

[429.3] ὥς ἐν τῷ περὶ προοιμίου' [Hermogenes 53.13]· σύγγραμμά ἐστιν
Ἑρμογένους περὶ προοιμίου, ὃ εὔρηται μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀναγραφαῖς, οὐ φέρεται
δέ.

F16 Anon. RG 7.63.20-23

τὸν λόγον περὶ προοιμίων ποιήσασθαι προεθέμεθα καὶ οὐ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν.
ἄρκούντως γὰρ τῷ τε Ἑρμογένει καὶ Πορφυρίῳ καὶ ἑτέροις περὶ αὐτῶν
λέλεκται.

F17 Simplicius *In Cat.* 10.20-11.2 (Theophrastus fr. 683 Fortenbaugh)

ὁ δὲ Πορφύριος σκοπὸν εἶναι τοῦ βιβλίου φησὶν ἐν τε τῷ πρὸς Γεδάλειον
καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν περὶ τῶν κατηγορουμένων· αὐτὰι δὲ
εἰσιν αἱ ἀπλαῖ φωναὶ αἱ σημαντικαὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, καθὸ σημαντικαὶ
εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ καθὸ λέξεις ἀπλῶς. καθὸ μὲν γὰρ λέξεις, ἄλλας ἔχουσι
πραγματείας, ἃς ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων ὃ τε Θεόφραστος

ἀνακινεῖ καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν γεγραφότες οἷον πότερον ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα ἢ καὶ ἄρθρα καὶ σύνδεσμοι καὶ ἄλλα τινά (λέξεως δὲ καὶ ταῦτα μέρη, λόγου δὲ ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα), καὶ τίς ἡ κυρία λέξις, τίς δὲ ἡ μεταφορική, καὶ τίνα τὰ πάθη αὐτῆς, οἷον τί ἀποκοπή, τί ἀφαίρεσις, τίνες αἱ ἀπλαῖ, τίνες αἱ σύνθετοι, τίνες αἱ ὑποσύνθετοι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὅσα περὶ ἰδεῶν εἴρηται, τί τὸ σαφὲς ἐν ταῖς λέξεσιν, τί τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές, τί τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ πιθανόν.

2. Translation

Biographical and bibliographical evidence

B1 Eunapius *Lives of the Sophists*

(a) 4.1.1f. (6.11-13 Giangrande): Porphyry had the standard education, and made such rapid progress and reached such a level of attainment that he was a pupil of Longinus and soon brought distinction to his teacher.

(b) 4.1.4 (6.21-24): Under his tuition he achieved the very highest level of culture, and—like him—reached the highest level of attainment in literary studies and rhetoric; however, he was not strongly inclined to that subject, but absorbed every branch of philosophy ...

(c) 4.2.2-3 (9.11-19): ... he did not omit any branch of culture. One might well be in doubt and wonder which of the things that he concerned himself with was primary—was it that which bears on rhetorical matters? or that which confers precision in literary scholarship? or that which is concerned with numbers? or that which is inclined to geometry? or that which bears on music? As for philosophy, his grasp of logic is beyond conceiving and his grasp of ethics beyond description; his grasp of physics and theurgy may be reserved for initiation rites and mysteries. To such an extent was this man a being infinitely adaptable to every excellence.

(d) 4.3 (10.11-13): At this time the foremost rhetoricians in Athens were Paul and Andromachus from Syria.

B2 Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* 10.3 (Porphyry 408F Smith)

Porphyry on the Greeks being plagiarists, from Book 1 of the *Literary Lectures*: Giving a feast for us on Plato's birthday in Athens, Longinus invited (among many others) the sophist Nicagoras, and Maior, Apollonius the grammarian, Demetrius the geometer, Prosenes the Peripatetic, and the Stoic Callietes. He himself was the seventh at the table with them, and as the meal progressed and a discussion about Ephorus arose among the others ...

B3 *Suda* Π2098

Porphyry, who wrote against the Christians. His proper name was Basileus; he was from Tyre, a philosopher, pupil of Amelius, Plotinus' pupil, and teacher of Iamblichus. His *floruit* was in the time of Aurelian, and he survived until the emperor Diocletian. He wrote an extraordinary number of books, on philosophy, rhetoric and literary studies. He studied with Longinus the critic. *On Divine Names* (1 book); *On First Principles* (2 books); *On Matter* (6 books); *On the Soul in reply to Boethus* (5 books); *On Abstinence from Animals* (4 books); *On 'Know Yourself'* (4 books); *On Incorporeals*; *On the Unity of the School of Plato and Aristotle* (in 7 books); *On Julian the Chaldaean's Philosophical History* (in 4 books); *Against the Christians* (15 books); *On Homer's Philosophy*; *Reply to Aristotle on the Soul being an Entelechy*; *Literary History* (5 books); *On Genus, Species, Differentia, and Proper and Accidental Properties*; *On the Sources of the*

Nile according to Pindar; *On the Usefulness of Homer to Kings* (10 books); *Miscellaneous Questions* (7 books); *On Thucydides' Proem*; *In Reply to Aristides* (7 books); *On Minucianus' Art*; and many other works, especially on astronomy, including an *Introduction to Astronomy* in 3 books; and *Grammatical Problems*. This is the Porphyry who spoke in an offensively insolent way against the Christians.

Testimonia and fragments

F1a Sopater *RG* 5.9.14-22 (Porphyry 415F Smith)

Porphyry, defending Minucianus against the same criticism (since he, too, when he said that 'the rhetor will speak on every political question' did not go on to explain what is meant by 'rhetor' or 'rhetoric'), advances this defence, which can also be appropriately spoken on Hermogenes' behalf. He says that he was not dealing with the whole of rhetoric, but only with the judicial and deliberative branches; so it is superfluous, when examining a part, to discuss the art as a whole.⁴⁶

F1b ?Marcellinus *PS* 293.14-26 (Porphyry 415bF Smith)

Some have criticised Hermogenes: why, when he is going to write about the art of rhetoric, did he not first of all give its definition? Porphyry says that there are three kinds of rhetoric, deliberative, judicial and panegyric, and that panegyric does not fall under the doctrine of issues (since the issues involve a dispute about disputed facts, but encomia involve amplification of acknowledged goods); so then, with the removal of panegyric, rhetoric would be incomplete; but definitions are not of things that are incomplete, but of complete wholes. For this reason, he says, he did not give a definition of rhetoric, because he was not dealing with the whole of it in this treatise.

F1c Athanasius *PS* 181.13-15 (Porphyry 415aF Smith)

One should not accept Porphyry's defence of Minucianus on behalf of Hermogenes as well.

F2a Sopater *RG* 5.5.28-8.30

[5.28] Now that we have dealt with the nature of the art, it is necessary to deal with its origin and development as well. It existed initially among the gods. They say that Homer proves this when he says 'the gods were sitting by Zeus's side, gathered in assembly' [*Iliad* 4.1]. It reached a peak among the heroes. In fact, Plato derives the name from this, from utterance and speaking, since he recognises the heroes as dialecticians and rhetoricians.⁴⁷ The poet too is clearly familiar with examples of all kinds of rhetoric. He says that the rapid, concise and demonstrative rhetor is 'like snowflakes' [*Iliad* 3.222], and the dense and concise, but no less demonstrative, 'at little length, but very clearly' [*Iliad* 3.214]; he is also

⁴⁶ In the discussion that follows (9.22-14.17) there are references to 'Porphyry's argument' at 5.9.27, 11.29, 14.17f.

⁴⁷ See *Cratylus* 398de, where 'hero' is associated with *eirein*, a verb of speaking.

familiar with the indiscipline of demagogy, and the character of those who speak without judgement or skill, such as Thersites 'whose head was full of vulgar abuse' [*Iliad* 2.213].

[6.12] They say that the first prosecution speech was made in Athens, when Theseus was accused in connection with the death of Hippolytus. Then it went into decline. For when tyrannies arose in the cities, inevitably rhetoric, which is committed to freedom and opposed to tyranny, became a dangerous crime. It is said that in Sicily Phalaris made a demagogic speech and won over the masses by his persuasiveness, and so made himself tyrant.

[6.20] Subsequently Corax was the first to establish a method of instruction in rhetoric. Those who practised the art before him did so on the basis of experience and hard work, and thus without an understanding of its rationale, or any art. But one of Corax's pupils was Tisias, about whom this story is told. Tisias agreed to pay Corax 1000 drachmas when he won his first victory in a case in court; since Corax was rather old, he refrained from going to court, to get out of the promise by his death. So Corax sued him for the debt, and said just this to the jury: 'If Tisias loses the case about the debt he has to pay me the 1000 drachmas, since he has won his first case in accordance with the agreement.' Tisias replied by saying: 'If I lose the case about the debt, I owe nothing, since I have won the case about the debt.' This response reduced the jury to bewilderment, and they shouted 'bad crow, bad egg'.⁴⁸

[7.9] So there came to be an intense rivalry with them with regard to the art. When Gorgias of Leontini came on an embassy to Athens he brought with him the *Art* which he had composed, and himself added another one. After him Antiphon of Rhamnous, the teacher of Thucydides, is said to have written another *Art*, and after him the rhetor Isocrates. These were all treatises on demagogic speaking, and did not contain any section on issues or the things that are now standard, but a certain kind persuasiveness needed for winning over the people. There is no dispute that the ancients did use art in their speeches, since the orators clearly declaimed the same subjects in different words and different forms speech but always in the same way—conjectural subject-matter always in the manner of conjecture and using the same heads, and practical subject-matter using the heads of the practical issue. So it is clear that they knew these things by some kind of tradition. So, then, the written treatises did not deal with these matters. That they also had written treatises on judicial oratory is clear from what Isocrates says: 'It remains for us to consider those of our predecessors who had the audacity to write a so-called *Art*. They must not be let off without criticism, since they were not able⁴⁹ to teach how to conduct legal cases, picking out the more captious sort of

⁴⁸ 'Crow': *korax*. The jury might reasonably have been bewildered by exchange reported in this mangled version of the story. Corax should argue that if Tisias loses the case about the debt he has to pay (in accordance with the verdict), and if he wins the case he has to pay (under the terms of their agreement); Tisias should reply that if he wins the case about the debt he does not have to pay (in accordance with the verdict), and if he loses he does not have to pay in accordance (under the terms of their agreement). Since the confusion occurs twice in this passage it probably does not result from textual corruption.

⁴⁹ Isocrates' text has 'they promised'.

ideas' [13.19]. However, these treatises on judicial oratory are not preserved. Whether it was in them that these heads and the issues were devised, or whether they were transmitted in some other way through instruction, it is clear that they proceeded by art; and this is evident from the fact that they all clearly declaimed subjects in similar ways.

[8.5] Rhetoric reached a pinnacle in the demagogy of Demosthenes' time. After that, in the reign of Antipater, when Hyperides' tongue was cut out and Demosthenes died, and ninety eight rhetors from Athens are said to have been handed over, and very many from the whole of Greece, rhetoric became an object of fear, and came to nothing while the Macedonian troubles held Greece in their grip. But when the Roman empire reached its peak and a sound political order took control of the cities, especially under Hadrian and Antoninus, emperors given to rhetoric and literary scholarship, *Arts* were again composed. The fact that Cicero, who lived earlier than they did, also clearly knew this art of rhetoric, makes it evident that it did survive.

[8.18] Of the technical writers currently in circulation, Lollianus was apparently the first. He said that there were seven issues, and after him Hermagoras said there were five.⁵⁰ Minucianus was their successor. Minucianus is said to have been the first to make the division into the thirteen issues, naming them from the aim of the defence. Hermogenes came after him. He came from Tarsus in Cilicia, the son of the younger Callippus, and had a great talent in this art. He is said to have appeared before Hadrian at the age of 18, saying 'I come before you, your majesty, a rhetor under a tutor, a rhetor in his minority.'⁵¹ At the age of 25 he is said to have gone completely insane, so that he did not even know his own compositions.

F2b Anon. *PS* 59.21-60.17

If every good thing is from god, rhetoric too is from god: being a good thing, it is from god. As to the existence of rhetoric among the gods, Homer clearly says 'the gods were sitting by Zeus's side, gathered in assembly' [*Iliad* 4.1], which belongs to rhetoric. As to the existence of rhetoric among the heroes, as Homer says 'words like snowflakes' [*Iliad* 3.222]. From the heroes <...> it is found in Sicily, when Phalaris practised speaking. Then Corax and his pupil Tisias. Then Gorgias of Leontini, when he came to Athens, and Isocrates wrote *Arts* and achieved greatness, and made the name of rhetoric famous in Greece. Under Macedon the name of rhetoric was overshadowed, and was seen as something to avoid, troublesome and extremely dangerous. Antipater killed 102 rhetors from Athens <...> from the whole of Greece. Then when Rome flourished Hermagoras wrote a *Political Art*, and Lollianus. Hermagoras recognised seven issues and Lollianus five. Minucianus was the first to set out the thirteen issues. Subsequently

⁵⁰ Our source has accidentally transposed the names of Lollianus and Hermagoras here: see n.8 above.

⁵¹ Philostratus *Lives of the Sophists* 2.7 (577-8). On the biographical traditions concerning Hermogenes see Heath (1998).

Hermogenes proved him guilty of considerable obscurity, and gave his own accurate exposition, with the result that he is preferred over Minucianus.

F3 Nicolaus *Progymnasmata* 55.18-20 Felten

So every subject-matter should be subsumed under the three named by Cornutus and Porphyry.⁵²

F4a Syrianus 2.14.9-14 (Porphyry 416F Smith)

For this reason Porphyry, in his treatise on the issues, put it well when, to indicate the full potential of the invention of thoughts in speech, he said: 'Since speech is thought to have a soul and a body, one could justly regard the invention of thoughts as the soul of speech and expression as its body.'

F4b Syrianus 1.93.9-13 (apparatus to Porphyry 416F Smith)

Hence the philosopher Porphyry, in considering these matters, said very well indeed that since speech is thought to have a soul and a body, one could justly regard the invention of thoughts as the soul of speech and expression as its body.

F4c Anon. *RG* 7.1086.12-7.1

Hence the philosopher Porphyry, in considering these matters, said very intelligently that since speech is thought to have a soul and a body, one could justly regard the invention of thoughts as the soul of speech and expression as its body. So Porphyry says that speech has a soul and a body, and makes a good point.

F5 Anon., Par. 3032 fol. 137r (Porphyry 417F Smith)

Porphyry says in the *Collection of Rhetorical Questions* that there are three questions at the most general level: whether something exists, what it is, and what qualities it has. Whether something exists <is in question in conjecture, what something is> in definition, and what qualities it has in the other issues.

F6a Anon. *RG* 7.921.2-4

The philosopher Porphyry, in his treatise on issues, says that there are seven elements of circumstance: person, act, time, place, manner, cause and material.

F6b Maximus Planudes *RG* 5.466.18f.

... those who say (among whom the philosopher Porphyry is included) that matter is a seventh element of circumstance.

F7 Porphyry *RG* 4.397.8-399.26

[397.8] Since the prosecutor, in making the sequence of events into signs, seems to coerce the juror and persuade him that it was because of the crime of which he is accused that the defendant did these things, the defendant has to argue against

⁵² The reference is to the three classes of oratory: cf. 54.23-5 ('panegyric ... judicial and deliberative'), 3.20-4.5 etc. See also F1b.

this, and assert that it was not because of the alleged wrongdoing that he acted, spoke or experienced the emotion. This is the transposition of the cause, which the followers of Hermagoras call 'gloss'.

[397.15] It is a solution to the sequence of events, and a solution with a counterposition. It will take the form either of a counterstatement, or of a transference, or of a counteraccusation, or of a plea of mitigation. Counterstatement, if we put forward some benefit; e.g. 'I take responsibility for the disinherited so that destitution will not make them turn to theft or conspiracy'. Likewise, it is also counterstatement when someone who has weapons is tried for conspiring to establish a tyranny; he will say 'I am keeping them for the city for use in emergency'. <Transference ... Counteraccusation ...> Pleas of mitigation are those based on ignorance, drunkenness (e.g. the rich young man who swore at a party that he would be tyrant: he will say 'no one takes any notice of things said in celebration and drink'); also on age ('it is characteristic of young men to make threats about tyrannies and engage in that kind of empty bragging'); and there is a transposition based on pity, as in the case of the man burying the recently slain corpse ('I buried him out of pity').

[397.30] The most general difference between glosses is twofold: some we find inherent in the subject, others we ourselves derive from other sources and furnish for ourselves. The subject itself provides one, as in the case of the man who left a talent in his will to another man's wife, saying that he did so because of her chastity; she is then charged with adultery. Here the gloss is inherent in the question: i.e. that the gift was because of her chastity. From outside the hypothesis, when we ourselves seek out the gloss and furnish it for ourselves, as in the case of the rich man looking at the acropolis: he will say that he was feeling pity for the victims of tyranny.

[398.9] The question of the number of glosses—whether one should use many or one, and whether they should be speculative or concerted—has already been discussed.

[398.11] The prosecutor expels the defendant's gloss by denying the consequent or demanding it. E.g.: Pericles is tried before the Megarians because of the decree, having been carried there.⁵³ He will say: 'I acted for your own good. When the Athenians were going to attack you I used the decree to put an end to their anger.' The opponent will expel this by demanding the consequent, saying: 'If that is the case, then you should have repealed it subsequently.' The inference from this is reached by the denial of the consequent: 'Well then, you did not do that: so it was not as a favour to the Megarians that you proposed it.' For in the demand for the consequent the positive is put first, then the negation follows. Conversely, when we put the denial first we confirm it by the positive. E.g. 'You acted for our good: then you should not have abided by what was inscribed in the public record, nor have resisted the Spartans when they asked you to revoke it. But you did this, and resisted. So it was not out of good will towards the Megarians that you did this.' Likewise in the case of the man who looked after the disinherited; he will say: 'I

⁵³ I.e. by a storm or similar misadventure.

did this for the good of the city, to ensure that lack of necessities did not make them conspire against the city.' The opponent will solve this by saying: 'When the city was in shortage you should have sought honour by donations of grain or contributed when she needed money; but you did not do these favours, so it was not out of good will that you acted.' This again is from the demand for the consequent, and then its denial. Or again: 'But I looked after them out of pity.' He will eject this by saying: 'You should have done so to those who were your own people, those attached to you by kinship, or to citizens who suffered from misfortune—not to the most wicked.' This is from the demand for the consequent. Demosthenes in the *False Embassy*, when Aeschines says with reference to Phocis that he was deceived, note how he made the ejection of the gloss: 'Well then, you should hate the man who deceived you; but in fact you do not hate him—so you were not deceived' [cf. 19.102-4]. And from denial thus: 'It was not right to neglect your own people, nor to be aggressive and inconsiderate towards the rest; and you are violent towards the citizens and inconsiderate towards your own. So it is not through care for the city nor out of pity that you look after these people.' Demosthenes too from denial: 'I do not hear any of these words, nor do you' [19.109].

[399.18] One should eliminate the glosses right from the prologues; this was Demosthenes' custom in the case of counterpositions—he prepared the solution to counterpositions in advance of their occurrence.

[399.20] The expulsion of glosses can also be achieved by the progressive elimination of causes. We begin by denying all the others in order to box our opponent into one, as in the case of the woman accused of adultery because she wept at night; the prosecutor will say: 'Your father has not died, nor your brother, nor your children.' Demosthenes made use of this when he said 'if you show through naiveté or ignorance' [19.98].

F8 Sopater Division of Questions 35.20-26

Next you will place an exception, according to Porphyry, based on manner. He says that the accusation of complicity is unreasonable, given that they have not been tried in a legally constituted court or found guilty in accordance with the laws, but have fallen victim to their enemies' malice. So some use an exception in this and similar cases, but others do not.

F9 'Sopater and Marcellinus' RG 4.520.20-522.26

[520.20] The resources which we will use to amplify the sequence of events are also the resources which we will use for the treatment of importance. The first topic of the amplificatory arguments is that from quantity. It is roughly as follows: when we are able to show from a single action performed that there have been wrongs done or benefits conferred. The second is from quality, e.g. who is affected, the city or the victim, and whether the person who did it wronged or benefited the city in a public or a private capacity.

[520.28] We shall confirm these things:

from the heads of purpose: from honour, perhaps (that what was done brings great honour to the city—or dishonour and outrage); from goodness: that the action was good, or on the contrary disgraceful.

from the concomitants of the action: these are, as has often been indicated: person, place, manner, time, cause, attitude; and according to Porphyry also occasion and matter; and:

<**from the concomitants of the person:**> individual character; age; status; occupation; fortune.

<**from probability:**> the probability of the occasion; the probability of the manner; the probability of the place; the probability of the cause.

[521.4] <**From the concomitants of the action:**>

- from person: e.g. 'You, men of Athens, when the Spartans ruled by land and sea and the territory surrounding Attica was held by governors and garrisons, Tanagra, Euboea and the whole of Boeotia ...' [Dem. 18.96].
- from place: if the action was not done in a corner but in open view, then the wrongdoing is great because of the conspicuousness of the place.
- from occasion: if he wronged or benefited someone in a time of need, the wrong or benefit was great.
- from manner: whether easily or with difficulty, by persuasion or force; you will amplify, indicating the exceptional degree of the agent's courage, or his outstanding skill or intelligence.
- from matter: if there is something remarkable or paradoxical about the resource used.
- from cause: if it occurred for some particularly praiseworthy or blameworthy reason, the action is great, as in the dissolution of a tyranny on account of freedom.
- from attitude: e.g. if he was well-disposed or ill-disposed.

from quantity:

- with respect to person: that there was benefit, or harm, to many people;
- with respect to time: that it extends to a long period, as in the case of the man who puts an end to a tyranny, that the benefit is everlasting, since no one will be tyrant in future, now that this man has voluntarily laid the tyranny aside;
- from quantity with respect to the consequences: that the results were many and great.

<**from the concomitants of the person:**>

- from individual character, when we say that he is the first or only person to dare such a thing, as Demosthenes does in *On the Crown*: 'You all know that you have before now crowned many politicians: but none of you could name another man—I mean an adviser or orator—on whose account the city has been crowned, except me' [Dem. 18.94].
- from age: whether he is young or old, bold or cautious.
- from status: whether a private individual or an official.
- from occupation: whether a farmer or a merchant.
- from fortune: whether poor or wealthy.

- from nationality: whether Greek or non-Greek.
- from nature: whether male or female.

from probability, if the action was performed:

- contrary to the probability of the place: where no one would have expected.
- contrary to the probability of the time: when no one supposed.
- contrary to the probability of the manner: that it was not likely in such a manner, i.e. in a paradoxical manner (e.g. using skill, trickery or speech, in a manner that no one expected).
- contrary to the probability of the cause: that the cause was such-and-such.

[522.12] We have gone through all these modes out of competitive ambition. But sufficient arguments for importance are those from the future, when we can show that the outcomes are many and great; e.g.: 'It is a terrible thing to break into temples and steal what is inside them, even if it is not sacred property: for private persons' deposits will lose their security, and from this will come crimes against dedications, contempt for the sacred, disdain for piety, loss of valuables among the citizens—for if not even temples are trustworthy repositories, what are we to think of storerooms in houses?' We will also argue from the less: 'Since, even if he had only broken in, he would not have escaped the charge of temple-robbery, he can scarcely do so now that he has added theft to breaking in.'

[522.25] Amplifications come from these sources; diminutions from their opposites.

F10 Anon. *RG* 7.235.4-21

This is the difference where there is some suffering and unjust action in the subject-matter. Where there is not (as in this counterplea: when Cleon made his promise about Pylos, Alcibiades laughed; he is charged with aggressive behaviour) there is another difference, that stated by Porphyry. In counterplea the act is permissible in its entirety, but in objection it is not permissible in its entirety (e.g. Alcibiades' laughter is permissible in every respect, including time and place; but killing the poor man who has been condemned to death is not permissible without qualification) ... According to our teacher Paul, another difference should be added: that objection is always based on some law, while counterplea may be based on custom or nature or law. With regard to that based on nature or custom, there is nothing in common between them at all; with regard to that based on law, the only case in which they do have something in common, Porphyry's distinction is satisfactory.

F11a Anon. *RG* 7.203.22-204.4

It is better to set these aside and accept Porphyry's distinction. It is as follows: if the wrongdoing is such that it could have been avoided, but allows of some extenuation, it is a case of transference (e.g. the law requires an ambassador to set out within 30 days, having received his travelling expenses from the treasurer: someone does not receive his expenses, stays, and is prosecuted: here the wrongdoing could have been avoided, since the ambassador could have taken out a loan or paid the expenses from his own resources). But if it could not have happened otherwise, that makes it mitigation (e.g. because a storm blew up the

generals did not recover the bodies of those who died at the battle of Arginusae, and they are prosecuted: they could do nothing about it because they were prevented by the storm).

F11b Christophorus fol. 101v-102r

Porphyry states this difference: if the wrongdoing is such that it could have been avoided, but allows of some extenuation, it is a case of transference (e.g. the ambassador: he could have got his travelling expenses from another source and gone on the embassy), but if it could not have happened otherwise, but there was a complete necessity for the act to be performed, that makes it mitigation (as in the case of the ten generals who do not recover the bodies of the fallen because a storm blows up: they could do nothing about it because they were prevented by the storm). Eustathius concurs with this.

F11c Maximus Planudes *RG* 5.261.1-4

Porphyry says that if the wrongdoing is such that it could have been avoided, but allows of some extenuation, it is a case of transference, but if it could not have happened otherwise the question is one of mitigation.

F12a Anon. *RG* 7.596.14-20

I have said this because there are those who assume other heads in the practical issues. I will pass over the people of no significance who have naively promoted certain ways of articulating an argument [*epikheirêmata*] to the rank of heads, but I will mention Porphyry, who counted importance and relative importance among the heads of the practical issue.

F12b Georgius fol. 214v

Others, including Metrophanes and Porphyry, say that the two amplificatory heads are relevant in the practical issue—I mean importance and relative importance.

F13a Marcellinus *RG* 4.268.16-269.1

The two verbal instruments in conflict of law must be in force. I say this, since it may be that one is already in force, while the other is only now being introduced. This does not constitute conflict of law, but the practical issue, as Porphyry says. For example, the law requires three days of deliberation over a declaration of war; when Philip seizes Elateia Demosthenes proposes an immediate sortie; Aeschines opposes. In this case the law is in force, and the motion being proposed must be subjected to scrutiny. But in fact Porphyry seems to have overlooked the difference between the practical issue when it is based on a conflict of law and conflict of law as such: for sometimes the practical issue also has two laws, but in conflict of law the decision required concerns a previous violation of the law, while in the practical issue there is deliberation and an enquiry as to which of the laws should be violated and which allowed to remain in force.

F13b Nilus fol. 170v

Porphyry said that conflict of law wants to be based on two verbal instruments that are in force.

F14 Sopater *Division of Questions* 381.29-382.2

Then importance, that the blow is serious; and you will produce all the lines of argument [*epikheirêmata*] that confirm importance. These are clear from the discussion of definition and Porphyry's *Art*.

F15 'Metrophanes, Athanasius, Porphyry, and Polemo' *RG* 4.422.18-429.5

[422.18] Some have said that epilogues are a second speech,⁵⁴ incorrectly: for an epilogue is speech uttered in addition to demonstrations that have already been spoken, but in second speeches other heads and arguments are found.

[422.22] 'It occurs in all':⁵⁵ since common quality is a feature of all speeches, and not just of conjectural ones, he has good reason to teach it in full in conjecture, to ensure that we are not ignorant of it in the other issues either. He has already established as a premise that the heads of conjecture contribute to the other issues as well.

[422.27] An epilogue is speech uttered in addition to demonstrations that have already been spoken, containing a collection of facts, characters and emotions; or a restatement of what has been said; or speech strengthening what has been said.⁵⁶

[422.30] Or according to Minucianus speech containing intensification or diminution of events, in which too there is the so-called 'vivid description' [*diatupôsis*] or 'elaboration' [*diaskeuê*] exciting emotion and leading the juror to a clear scrutiny of events. Epilogues also contain exhortations, recapitulations and supplementary narratives.

[423.3] The function of the epilogue according to Plato in the *Phaedrus* [267d] is by speaking in a summary to give the audience a reminder at the end; second, to praise or blame; third, to give a reminder of what has been said.⁵⁷

[423.7] They are introduced 'by prosecutors running through the charge in the manner of a common topic, and by defendants recapitulating points in a similar way, but making a different use of them, appealing for pity and stirring up emotion.'⁵⁸

[423.10] Plato, who had a good knowledge of the management of pity and emotion, expressed it clearly in a single phrase in the *Apology*, when he speaks of 'these pathetic dramas'.⁵⁹ He gives the appearance of making overt use of them while

⁵⁴ Cf. Hermogenes 52.6f.

⁵⁵ Lemma from Hermogenes 52.7.

⁵⁶ Cf. Anon. Seg. 198-200.

⁵⁷ Cf. Anon. Seg. 207-8; the apparent duplication of the first and third functions results from the running together of a reference to Plato with a citation of Aristotle.

⁵⁸ Abbreviated from Hermogenes 52.8-17.

⁵⁹ *Apology* 35b. The rest of the paragraph adapts material from 34b-e.

setting them aside on the grounds that it is not fitting for a philosopher and a man who has reached such a level of virtue to secure his safety by making people pity and feel sorry for him, but was almost misleading in what he said, using a remarkable and very rhetorical technique, by means of which he raised his own dignity while at the same time not foregoing the advantage that arises from this matter, assigning what is appropriate to each—solemnity to philosophy and what belongs to that science to rhetoric. Positing one of the jury being annoyed about why he is treating them superciliously by rejecting a verdict based on pity, he says: 'Perhaps one of you will be annoyed if I do not supplicate with my children and my wife and many tears, and I do none of this. I do have sons. But this kind of behaviour does not contribute to the good reputation either of myself or of the city; it is not right for someone of high dignity to resort to appeals to pity'—so saying this in the form of a reply, as if he were forced to, he insinuated the things that move the jury to pity, when he says: 'Perhaps one of you will be annoyed, when he remembers his own experience, if in a lesser case than this he begged and supplicated the jury with many tears, presenting his children to extract the maximum pity, and his other relatives and friends, while I do none of these things, although I am exposed, as it may appear, to the ultimate danger' (and so on). Then he added the argument from dignity to the technique: 'Why, then, will I do none of these things? Not out of obstinacy, nor doing you any dishonour' (and what follows).

[424.9] Appeals to pity are characteristic of the defence, and the prosecutor must expel them. For pity often dissolves the intensity of the prosecution. That this has the greatest potency can be seen from this: Callixenus persuaded the Athenians to condemn the generals to death just by introducing into court the relatives of the fallen dressed in mourning and weeping and bearing the suppliant's olive-branch.⁶⁰ This head is so powerful that, even though the reason for the failure to recover the bodies was patently obvious, they did not forbear from condemning generals who had won such a glorious and decisive victory. So the prosecutor needs a strong counter. So what will he do? He will deploy the heads of purpose against the appeals to pity.

[424.23] Common quality is common to the two parties.

[424.24] One should realise that the epilogue is often omitted, and sometimes also the prologue and the narrative, so that the question resides in the demonstrations alone.⁶¹

[424.27] One should take care in epilogues that if we are prosecuting we make the audience hostile to the defendant, and if we are offering a defence we make the juror well-disposed to ourselves.⁶²

[424.30] Aristotle says⁶³ that there are four parts of the epilogue: first, moving the audience to emotion; secondly making them take a hostile attitude to our

⁶⁰ Cf. Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.7.8; sch. Dem. 20.68 (157).

⁶¹ Cf. Anon. Seg. 202.

⁶² Cf. Anon. Seg. 235.

⁶³ *Rhetoric* 1419b10-13.

opponents and a favourable one to ourselves; also amplification and debasement: and finally giving a reminder. Often one should not use all of them, but only some.

[425.3] The methods of recapitulation among the ancients are diverse. They use recapitulations based on:

- fiction, as Hyperides does: when he wanted to recapitulate what had been said, he introduced it in a fiction.⁶⁴
- cause, as in Plato's *Phaedrus*, on the basis of the stated causes by means of which he reasonably gives a reminder of what has been said.
- promise: that having previously made a promise we wish to fulfil what was promised in a summary, as we find in the *False Embassy*: 'I want to reckon up the charges from the beginning, to show that I have done everything I promised at the beginning of the speech' [19.177].
- comparison with another, as Demosthenes does in the same speech: by comparing the ambassadors to others [19.278] he made the introduction of the recapitulation inevitable, as has already been said.
- enquiry: the orator gave a splendid example in *On the Crown*: wanting to go through all the praises of himself in a summary, since this would be irritating to the audience, he devised the technique of enquiry, which enabled him simultaneously with pomp and elaboration but without giving offence to go through all his virtues while appearing to speak under compulsion. He represents Aeschines posing a question, introducing him thus: 'Then you ask me for what virtue I think I should be honoured? I tell you that when all the politicians on the Greek side were corrupted—starting from you—first by Philip, then by Alexander, no occasion and nothing else whatsoever could win me over' [18.297f.].

Another possibility is based on:

- concession, using the figure of drawing a distinction, when the opponent tries to transfer the blame to another party, and we do not discuss that in detail, but define for our part the grounds on which we are making our accusation, as Demosthenes does in *Against Aeschines*: when Aeschines shifts the basis of the accusation to Chares, as general, he says that he does not insist on that (even if he does surreptitiously defend Chares to the utmost, as acting entirely for the good of the city), but defines the grounds of his accusation against Aeschines, when he says: 'I do not blame Aeschines for what was done in the war (it is the generals who are answerable for that), nor for the fact that the city made peace—up to that point I leave everything to one side.' Then the drawing of the distinction: 'What, then, am I saying, and at what point does my accusation begin?' (and so on) [19.333].

⁶⁴ The reference is to Hyperides' *Against Demades*. Cf. Hyperides fr. 76 Jensen = 'Apsines' 10.9 Patillon, John Diaconus on pseudo-Hermogenes *On Method*, fol 481v (Rabe (1908) 144): Hyperides summarised his attack on a decree proposed by Demades in honour of Euthycrates by reading out a fictive decree telling the truth about the honorand. The extract from John Diaconus printed by Rabe introduces a fivefold classification of recapitulations, and then gives that based on fiction at greater length, with the example from Hyperides in detail; but Rabe does not reproduce the rest of the classification.

There are other techniques for recapitulation, as well, which one should pay careful attention to, observing the manner of treatment used to introduce each of them, and exhibiting those treatments that are opportune, but avoiding those that are introduced baldly.

[426.17] One should use recapitulation when many things have been said, with the result that the audience cannot remember them; when there only a few things, we omit it.⁶⁵

[426.19] We will find that the ancients used different kinds of recapitulation. Many used it at the end, as Demosthenes does in *Against Aristocrates* and *Against Timocrates*; many too in the middle, as in *On the Embassy*; and they used it also between the leading and necessary proofs. There is also another mode of recapitulation, occurring at the end of an individual head. These recapitulations differ from each other in that that at the end of the speech contains a summary exposition; that in between has a reminder of the necessary proofs; that occurring at the end of an individual head does not contain a reminder of the heads, but of the lemmata used to demonstrate the preceding head.⁶⁶

[426.31] One should recapitulate the stronger points but pass over the less sound ones, as we have said, and likewise omit the more forceful points of the opposition.⁶⁷

[427.2] Demosthenes invented another, innovative recapitulation, opposing ambassadors to ambassadors, mandate to mandate: 'Since they conducted their embassy contrary to their mandate, he says: but didn't these men act contrary to their mandate?' [19.278].

[427.6] The development of the common topic should be used when the power to fix the penalty—what punishment or reparation should be imposed—resides with the jury.

[427.8] Often we will pass over the emotive element, when the act does not have any emotion in it.⁶⁸

[427.10] 'The so-called heads of purpose are common to both sides':⁶⁹ they are called *telika* because they are placed at the end [*epi telei*] of speeches (as also in common topic); or because they are complete [*teleion*] in themselves, and unlike other heads are not confirmed one by another (as the demand for evidence is confirmed by the signs); or because all the other heads, and to put it simply everything else altogether, leads to these (for we put something forward as lawful, or as advantageous, or as just, or as honourable, or as one of these).

⁶⁵ Cf. Anon. Seg. 204.

⁶⁶ Cf. 'Apsines' 10.3.3-30 Patillon; this passage, and the nature of 'leading and necessary proofs', is discussed in Heath (2002).

⁶⁷ Cf. Anon. Seg. 212.

⁶⁸ Cf. Anon. Seg. 205.

⁶⁹ Lemma from Hermogenes 52.19f. 'Heads of purpose' translates *telika kephalaia*; the following discussion of this term turns on multiple sense of the Greek word *telos* (purpose, end, completion).

[427.20] The defendant will use these saying: 'It is in your interest not to pay attention to malicious prosecutors or be persuaded by them: they are the people who undermine the public interest.' And: 'You will be faithful to your oath if you do not condemn me unjustly.' The prosecutor, on the contrary, when the defendant introduces his children and pity, will try to nullify these using the heads of purpose.

[427.25] 'From the same topics as prologues':⁷⁰ the theorist may seem to have mentioned prologues here inopportunistly. But we say that in discussing the epilogue, since he saw that there is a close affinity between the epilogue and the prologue (both are confirmed from the same things, and each exists with a view to the same thing), for this reason he necessarily mentions the difference between them, wishing to distinguish what they have in common: both excite pity, or resentment or emotion; for instance, Demosthenes excites anger at the beginning of the prologue in *Against Meidias*, accusing Meidias of 'bullying' [21.1]. He does this in the epilogue as well, launching attacks in the manner of a common topic.

[428.4] They differ in figuration and style of expression. In the prologue the figures should be moderate, mild and (so to speak) tamed; since the jury is more sober at the beginning and their emotion has not yet been stirred up, one should share the audience's emotional state and advance one's own and the audience's emotion gently. This is the case if we are moderate in the use of figures, vocabulary and arrangement of words, and moderate too in delivery. The epilogue, by contrast, should be made vigorous by the use of figures, and should have many exclamations and many reproaches. Prologues are tightly expressed, while epilogue is free in its style. In addition, there is also a difference with regard to the material. Many of the things said in the prologue do not need to be said in the epilogue; for example, someone is suspect when he enters court because of his interfering and officious behaviour: since the suspicion has been resolved in the prologue it is not necessary to speak about it in the epilogue; and there are other kinds of prologue material which, once they have been thoroughly covered in the prologue, make it superfluous to mention them in the epilogue. There are also kinds of material in the epilogue which we do not use in the prologue (e.g. it is not a good idea to bring preconceptions concerning the heads of argument into the prologue: that will open up old wounds in the prologue), but in the epilogue it is necessary to include them to some extent to strengthen the case. The difference, then, is that the one prepares the emotion, while the epilogue amplifies it.⁷¹

[428.30] The defendant will try in the prologue to minimise the emotion and the prejudice (it would be absurd to eliminate it entirely at the outset, before the demonstrations), but in the epilogue after the demonstration he will try to eliminate it and expel it altogether.

[429.3] 'In my treatment of the prologue':⁷² there is a treatise by Hermogenes on the prologue, which is found in the records, but is not extant.

⁷⁰ Lemma from Hermogenes 53.1f.

⁷¹ Cf. Anon. Seg. 19-20, 237.

⁷² Lemma from Hermogenes 53.13.

F16 Anon. *RG* 7.63.20-23

We have proposed to discuss prologues, and not the other parts, since there has been adequate discussion of these by Hermogenes, Porphyry and others.

F17 Simplicius *In Cat.* 10.20-11.2 (Theophrastus fr. 683 Fortenbaugh)

Porphyry says in *To Gedalius* and *By Question and Answer* that the book's theme is concerned with predicates. These are simple vocalisations that signify things, in so far as they are significant, and not simply as verbal expressions. As verbal expressions they belong to other disciplines, to which Theophrastus gave the impetus in his *On the Parts of Speech*, and his associates, who have written on (e.g.) whether nouns and verbs are parts of speech, or also articles, conjunctions etc. (for these too are components of verbal expression, but nouns and verbs are parts of speech), and what is standard usage and what metaphorical, and what its modifications are (e.g. what apocope and aphaeresis are, which are simple, which compound and which derived from compounds, and suchlike); also what has been said about types of style [*ideai*]¹—what clarity is in verbal expression, what grandeur, what pleasantness, what persuasiveness.

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Additional notes, March 2003

Subsequent research suggests the following corrections to the discussion of Porphyry's rhetorical writings in Heath (2003a):

144: For reasons explained in Heath (forthcoming), I now date Aelius Theon to the fifth century; on the title of Theon's collection see *bid.* n.45. To the list of attested collections of declamation themes add Anastasius ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ τῶν προβλημάτων, quoted by Georgius fol. 143r (Schilling (1903) 733-5). Anastasius of Ephesus is also cited in *RG* 6.253.22-5 as denying the authenticity of the *Fourth Philippic*.

146 n.18: John ὁ σημειογράφος should be deleted from the list of commentators on Hermogenes. The rhetor cited as ὁ σημειογράφος in Christophorus and Nilus is probably identical with the sophist John ὁ σημειογράφος, who was teaching in Alexandria in the 480s, and with John of Alexandria who wrote a theoretical work on the characteristics of and differences between the issues. For more detail see Heath (2003b) 33.

157: I no longer think it adequate to describe the Sopater of *RG* 4 as a redacted version of Sopater in *RG* 5: instead we are dealing with two substantively different commentaries. The Sopater who wrote the commentary from which *RG* 5 derives worked (probably) in the late fourth century; the excerpts in *RG* 4 derive from commentary which incorporated material adapted from the earlier Sopater, but also from other sources, including at least one which is likely to date to the fifth century. The Sopater of *RG* 4, who is likely to be the Sopater who wrote the *Progymnasmata* cited by John of Sardis, can plausibly be identified with a sophist of that name who taught in Alexandria in the 480s. See Heath (2003b) 27-33, and (forthcoming).

161: The distinction between the Sopater of *RG* 5 and the Sopater of *RG* 4 is also relevant here. I now suspect a change of source at *RG* 4.520.6; but since the Sopater of *RG* 4 combined (without always properly integrating) material from a number of sources, I would regard this as evidence of a change of source within Sopater, rather than as evidence of a change of source within the three-man commentary.

164 n.100: Analysis of their respective treatments of *metalepsis* provides further evidence against the identification of the Sopater of *Division of Questions* with the Sopater of the commentary on Hermogenes: see Heath (2003b) 11f.

I should have included a reference to an intriguingly entitled work which mentioned Porphyry, probably as a technical writer on rhetoric, and presumably in an uncomplimentary way. See *Suda* A2180: Ἀνδροκλείδης, ὁ τοῦ Συνεσίου τοῦ Λυδοῦ τοῦ Φιλαδελφέως υἱός. οὗτος δὲ ἐπὶ Πορφυρίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐδίδασκεν, ἐπειδὴ μέμνηται αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ [τῶν Portus] ἐμποδῶν τεχνολόγων.